


AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE IN  
SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
Homeland Security Studies

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2014-01

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>				<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)	2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
13-06-2014	Master's Thesis		AUG 2013 – JUN 2014	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
An Examination of the Role of the United States Army Reserve in Support of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)			5b. GRANT NUMBER	
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
MAJ James K. Rowsey II			5e. TASK NUMBER	
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT				
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
14. ABSTRACT				
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15. SUBJECT TERMS				
Defense Support of Civil Authorities, United States Army Reserve, DCRF, CBRN, NORTHCOM, JTF-CS, PACOM, Department of Defense, FEMA, National Response Framework				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)	(U)	121
19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)				

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA), by MAJ James K. Rowsey II, 121 pages.

This study investigates the operational aspects of the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations within the Department of Defense. Within the primary research construct, focus was the Army Reserve. This research utilized DOTMLPF design methodology to assess the current and desired operating environments, as well as identify operational gaps. This research reviewed current fiscal constraints and limitations in regards to the active component, limiting operational approach recommendations to current force allocations. It does not call for additional assets, but does provide focus areas should they be required in the future for a reevaluation of the Army Reserve force structure.

This study focuses heavily on the Army Reserve's role in DSCA missions, and its possible future missions while operating in a resource-constrained environment. The Army Reserve when required to provide a further significant role, will under limited time and resources accomplish the mission. Maintaining a relevant study area was key to this research with the wealth of information available. Research includes an extensive study of current laws and doctrine, which provide oversight to DSCA missions. Additionally, force structure and staffing recommendations support operations during DSCA events in order to make the Army and Army Reserve's DSCA missions more effective.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is the direct result of the efforts of many significant figures throughout my time at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The countless instructors and mentors during the academic year have taught me to think critically, challenge assumptions, and seek answers to the deeper question of “so what?” My committee of Dr. O. Shawn Cupp, Mr. Britt W. Estes, and Mr. Thomas G. Meara provided the guidance and encouragement needed to improve my understanding of such a challenging topic, and complete this in-depth analysis. They will never be forgotten for their contributions to this work.

I would be remiss not to recognize the stellar support and work of the Graduate Degree Programs Office: Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Dr. Prisco R. Hernandez, and especially Ms. Venita A. Krueger for their guidance, instruction and support. I would also like to thank the staff at the Combined Arms Research Library and Mr. John Dubuisson for their unwavering support during the research portion of this study.

I would also like to thank my instructors and colleagues of Staff Group 23 Alpha. This group of instructors took great care in our learning environment. I owe deep gratitude to Mr. Thomas G. Meara (DTAC), Mr. Kenneth A. Szmed (DJIMO), Mr. Leonard Verhaeg (DLRO), LTC John Bettaso (DCL), and Dr. Gary J. Bjorge (DMH). This year will always hold a special place in my heart with the knowledge shared in our classroom, and the life-long friends made. Broadening my understanding with different perspectives throughout our time together will always push me for the deeper meaning.

I would especially like to thank my mentors and friends: MG David W. Puster, BG George R. Thompson, BG John E. Cardwell, BG (Ret) James T. Cook, COL (Ret)

David T. Mitchell, COL Aaron T. Walter, COL James H. Murphy, LTC Leslie M. Dillard, LTC Michael S. Vail, CSM Luther Thomas Jr., and CSM Leonard Lightner. Without your direction, guidance, and friendship, I would not be where I am today. You have each greatly inspired and or challenged me in achieving my professional goals, and for that, I will be forever grateful.

To my father, mother, and brothers whose support and prayers have been there my entire life, I would not be here without you. As parents, you have always shown me that hard work and dedication pays off in the end. For inspiration, I turn to my brothers, for I have always tried to be more than just a brother to you, but also someone you can look up to as a role model, and always call as a friend.

To my grandfathers who are no longer with us, I think about you both daily. You each provided me with goals and dreams to become the very best I could be in your own way. I miss you both, and wish you were here to see this achievement you challenged me to accomplish. To my great-grandmother and grandmother whose love never waned in your support of my dreams. To all of my family whose support brought me to accomplishing my goals, I love you all.

Most of all, I thank my Lord and Savior for all the blessings in my life. I am just a humble servant trying to follow the path you have laid before me. This all could not have been possible without my best friend and amazing wife, Stephanie, whose support never ceases to amaze me. Your unconditional love for me has led me to feats I never would have imagined for myself. I look forward to many years to come. To my wonderful children Kayla, Chloe, and Trey for their unwavering love and understanding through this whole process. There is no greater love than that of a father's love for his children.

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## ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
C2CRE	Command and Control CBRN Response Element
CBRN	Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
DCE	Defense Coordinating Element
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DCRF	Defense CBRN Response Force
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	Doctrine Organization Training Materiel Leadership Personnel Facilities
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
EPLO	Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
ESF	Emergency Support Functions
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
IRA	Immediate Response Authority
JTF-CS	Joint Task Force Civil Support
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NMS	National Military Strategy

NORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
NRF	National Response Framework
NSS	National Security Strategy
OPLAN	Operational Plan
PACOM	United States Pacific Command
POTUS	President of the United States
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RFA	Request for Assistance
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
TF	Task Force
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Overview

Our national preparedness is shared responsibility of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens. Everyone can contribute to safeguarding the Nation from harm. As such, while this directive is intended to galvanize action by the Federal Government, it is also aimed at facilitating an integrated, all-of-Nation, capabilities-based approach to preparedness.

— President Barack Obama, *Presidential Policy Directive 8*

#### Introduction

It is morning rush hour in any major metropolitan area in the United States.

Without any concern, millions of Americans are going to work, school, or performing other daily rituals. Within a split-second a natural disaster or act of terrorism takes place.

Ten of thousands of lives are lost in the blink of an eye. This could very well happen in our country one day, and has to some extent times before. Natural disasters happen each day within the boundaries of the United States. Predominantly handled at the local or state level, one could escalate to the need of federal assistance and the response of our federal military forces. Our Nation's forces must remain ready and relevant to answer the call. The Army Reserve may provide that assistance, and must be ready for the challenge.

Congress has always shown determined interest in the strength of the armed forces of our nation, to include the reserve components. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a steady increase in the use of the reserve components for operations around the world. This increased operational tempo has led the legislative branch to show a much deeper concern with the reserve components in many areas to include equipment,

training, personnel, funding, and mobilizations. The factors behind the increased use of the reserve component are due to the decreasing size of our active component forces, and continuous operations around the world.

Since 11 September 2001, over 213,000 Army Reserve Soldiers have been activated for various operations in support of Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn. As of 10 September 2013, over 14,000 remain currently activated.<sup>1</sup> The increased role of the Operational Reserve properly planned, could continue for years to come and provide a fully integrated partner in DSCA to the Total Army. The Army Reserve has provided a portion of strategic and operational depth for the Total Army through ARFORGEN (figure 1). These assigned and allocated forces have been critical to the on-going success of our missions. As overseas rotational missions decline, these forces could be utilized for further Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions, supporting the active forces with critical elements of the War-Fighting Functions (Wff).





Figure 1. Army Reserve Strategic and Operational Depth for the Total Army

*Source: United States Army Reserve, 2020: Vision and Strategy Statement (Fort Bragg, NC: USARC, February 2011), 3.*

This vast amount of mobilizations and active duty experience have cultivated within the Army Reserve a skill set of experienced leaders and combat veterans. These Soldiers have continued to serve as Citizen-Soldiers in their communities. A ready and resilient force who not only bring in key military experiences, but also civilian acquired skills that are sometimes not present in the active component. Over the past decade, countless Army Reserve Soldiers have not only been an integral part of the One-Army construct, but have also continued to enhance its presence in operations supporting DCSA missions daily.<sup>2</sup> Title 10 Federal Department of Defense (DoD) response assets can total well above 6,700 Soldiers on any given day (figure 2). Though numbers fluctuate yearly on the mission, the Army Reserve continues to play a prominent role in DCSA missions that will be further discussed in chapter 4.



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Figure 2. DoD Response Assets

Source: JTF-CS Briefing 101, 15 July 2013.

The initial step in understanding this area of study is providing the definition of DSCA and differentiating the role of the Army Reserve from the Active Component (AC). “DSCA is the support provided by U.S. Federal military forces and assets, . . . and, coordination with the Governors, Federally funded National Guard forces in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.”<sup>3</sup> The process for request for assistance (RFA) for DoD forces for a DSCA mission has been defined through the National Response Framework (NRF) (figure 3). This framework streamlines the request for federal assistance. In chapter 2, the NRF will be further discussed in detail as it relates to this study.



Figure 3. The National Response Framework In Action “Lifecycle of a Disaster”

Source: JTF-CS Briefing 101, 15 July 2013.

The term “Reserve Component” refers collectively to the seven individual reserve components of the armed forces: the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The purpose of these seven reserve components, as codified in law at Title 10 United States Code (USC) 10102, is to “provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.” The focus of this study will be the Army Reserve specifically.

The direct connection as defined between DSCA and the Army Reserve is the mandate of the support provided by U.S. Federal military forces under Title 10, USC. With that direct correlation, the role of the Army Reserve in Title 10, USC will be discussed. Understanding the mission will enhance the overall objective as the question is answered if the Army Reserve can achieve a greater presence in the DSCA missions.

The DoD provides the direction and strategy for DSCA missions, and the role of the forces assigned in response to a catastrophic event.<sup>4</sup> The significance of the response is critical. Support forces under DSCA must be able to adapt, be responsive, and available at the required timeframes requested to avoid loss of life or further injury to the civilian populace. Significant changes began with the development of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. Support became clearly defined from DoD when the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) mandated a DoD response force to be structured and trained to support a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) event.<sup>5</sup> This force initially would be called the CBRN Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF), now Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF), and would respond to any CBRN event in the continental United States and its territories in support to civil authorities.<sup>6</sup> Army Reserve forces have been assigned to these specific missions since their origins, and have played a crucial role. This response force would also require the creation of a command and control headquarters. Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) would soon be organized to fulfill that role.

JTF-CS works under the authority of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and provides command and control for DoD forces deployed in support of the Lead Federal Agency managing a DSCA mission in the United States, and its

territories. Though supporting civil authorities is not a new mission for DoD, these new structures have ensured coordination unseen in the past. Whether DoD forces have assisted federal, state and local agencies during natural disasters or man-made events, it has always answered the call with great success and performed the mission to the highest of military standards.<sup>7</sup>

Providing a fundamental understanding is critical to the overall study of how and why Army Reserve forces would be utilized in DSCA. Shortly after the tragic events of 11 September 2001, a Presidential Directive created the Department of Homeland Defense and Homeland Security (DHS) of the United States.<sup>8</sup> The DoD when directed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) conducts DSCA in support of the National Response Framework (NRF) and the Lead Federal Agency (DHS/FEMA). NORTHCOM then provides on order, a capable force in response to an incident. NORTHCOM has assigned this mission to U.S. Army North (ARNORTH) as the headquarters that possess authority over Title 10 Forces allocated to DSCA missions. ARNORTH would utilize JTF-CS in most cases for all mission assignments in the area of responsibility (AOR). DHS has further subdivided the United States into ten FEMA regions (figure 4). Each region is represented by a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) (Colonel/O-6) that reports to NORTHCOM during DSCA missions.<sup>9</sup> The DCO commands a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) we will further discuss in chapter 2.




Figure 4. FEMA Regions with their respective DCOs Map

*Source:* Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, July 2013).

The foundations of DSCA will be discussed in detail within this research. Having a general understanding of where this study will lead is key to the overall findings and analysis of this study. Review of the governing laws that regulate the use of federal forces in DSCA will include: the Stafford Act, Economy Act, Insurrection Act, and Homeland Security Act will be further examined under chapter 2 of this research.<sup>10</sup> Analysis of these governing laws will provide further detailed understanding of the role the Army Reserve can provide in DSCA missions. Further understanding of the complexities our military are confronted with today is of critical importance as well to this study as it

progresses. Where the Army is today, and where it will be in the future are questions many would like answered.

General Raymond Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, stated in an interview with the *New York Times* that the “active Army will cut its force by 80,000 over the next five years.”<sup>11</sup> These cuts are largely impacted by the 2011 Budget Control Act that required \$487 billion in military spending cuts over a decade. Sequestration could have a very large impact on the readiness of our Armed Forces, and potential cuts to the Army Reserve are still being discussed. With cuts looming, the active Army may not be able to meet all of the assigned missions as mandated in the National Military Strategy (NMS), if they were all to occur at once. A viable solution could be the Army Reserve as a force multiplier in terms of the previously mentioned assigned and allocated force.

Is this an opportunity for the Army Reserve to increase its presence into a mission that it has largely just been a minor player in over the past ten years? An in-depth analysis of current policies and doctrine will enable a comprehensive review of the questions intended for answer. The focus of study cannot merely be the Army Doctrine available. This research must include a thorough analysis of DSCA research and National Strategy and Policies, to include literature associated with United States Governmental Organizations that play a major role in DSCA. The outline established will follow a clear and precise means in order to effectively conduct a qualitative review.

With this information, could it be deduced that in order for the Army Reserve to grow it may only need to show its capability in quantifiable results so senior leaders would have confidence in the formations. Enhanced belief in the overall concept that the Army Reserve can be built into a strong on-going DSCA assigned rotational force; one

which can become a legacy mission assigned, may require additional time and research. Analysis of what is known, and not known will bring forth the author's findings and analysis, and a conclusion that may very well lead to suggested further research.

The Army Reserve being assigned an increased role in DSCA is in line with the Army's Regionally Assigned Forces policy currently being enacted with the downsizing of the force.<sup>12</sup> Army Reserve forces could become more regionally aligned with NORTHCOM on a rotational basis. The research study will be an in-depth qualitative study that examines all aspects of the current roles and possible future roles of the Army Reserve in support of DSCA.

This research could potentially add to current literature on the perception of the Army Reserve. Leadership must have trust and confidence in the capabilities of the Army Reserve in support of the Total Army. It could also add to the general area of studies and discussions that are reviewed at the strategic and operational levels.

This study's goal is to assist in assessing the Army Reserve's readiness, leaders' opinions, knowledge, and operational patterns in regard to the DSCA mission. It is the author's goal to assist in further discussions in this time of great animosity of the great unknown of what our future force will become. Is the operational Army Reserve capable of a greater role in DSCA as the active component continues to draw down in size?

### Problem Statement

Integration of fully trained Army Reserve units in DSCA is paramount for critical immediate response at the time of a crisis. The research will be based on NORTHCOM CONPLANS, joint doctrine, army doctrine, professional reviews, and documents published by the DoD and other agencies. Furthmore, the research will focus on the

organizational structure and roles of the Army Reserve units assigned to NORTHCOM and United States Pacific Command (PACOM) in response to a catastrophic event. The research will determine if doctrine, organization, and training are inclusive to meet the needs of the American people. Further analysis will briefly review the organizational structure of the Army Reserve MTOE units to analyze if they are configured to meet DSCA mission requirements. Research will address the response time of the DSCA force packages and if the Army Reserve can meet those marks. Analysis will also be conducted of the unit readiness for assigned war time missions to validate whether DSCA has an effect on overall readiness of the force.

#### Research Question

What will be the Army Reserve's role in Defense Support of Civil Authorities future mission while operating in a resource constrained environment?

#### Secondary Research Questions

How would the Army Reserve accomplish this mission with limited time and resources?

How could the Army Reserve man, equip, and train forces required to proactively and comprehensively support operations during DSCA events?

#### Significance of Study

The reason this topic is important is because the Army Reserve is comprised of Citizen-Soldiers who are engaged on a daily basis with communities across our country. The Army Reserve provides a Title 10 federal military presence in every state, commonwealth, and territory. Critical civilian experiences of Army Reserve Soldiers

could greatly contribute to a positive effect on the overall success of the DSCA missions.

For years, the role has been that of a support one in DSCA, it may now be time for a broader role.

With budget constraints and the downsizing of our active Army, NORTHCOM and PACOM, as the executive agents for the Department of Defense mission of DSCA, will address through FORSCOM the deficiencies currently faced in meeting the needs of the Presidents' National Security Strategy in protection of our homeland. Disaster can strike at an instant, and our nation's military has to be ready to respond with the right skill set to meet any challenge.

### Assumptions

The following assumptions are believed to remain true, and add relevance to the research project. The research literature will be drawn from credible resources for the qualitative research and review. Understanding the limitations listed, it is the belief of the author that focusing the research to known resources, a final conclusion can be achieved without regard to individual perspectives, beliefs, and opinions. A high-level academic research can be achieved that one can formulate a conclusion, and promote further discussions and research.

### Definition of Key Terms

Active Duty (AD): Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. This includes members of the Reserve Component serving on active duty or full-time training duty, but does not include full-time National Guard duty.<sup>13</sup>

Catastrophic Event: Any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.<sup>14</sup>

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA): DSCA is support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and, in coordination with the Governors, Federally funded National Guard forces in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for “special events.”<sup>15</sup>

DOTMLPF: This acronym is defined in the *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* and refers to the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities of a specific program or system. This acronym assists commanders and staffs in ensuring that all aspects of the system are evaluated prior to execution of an effort.<sup>16</sup>

Force Multiplier: A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.<sup>17</sup>

Immediate Response Authority (IRA): A Federal military commander’s, Department of Defense component head’s, and/or responsible Department of Defense civilian official’s authority temporarily to employ resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, and provide those resources to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage in response to a

request for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions when time does not permit approval from a higher authority within the United States.

Immediate response authority does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.<sup>18</sup>

Incident: An occurrence, caused by either human action or natural phenomena, that requires action to prevent or minimize loss of life, or damage, loss of, or other risks to property, information, and/or natural resources.<sup>19</sup>

Reserve Components: The term “Reserve Component” refers collectively to the seven individual reserve components of the armed forces: the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The purpose of these seven reserve components, as codified in law at Title 10 U.S.C. 10102, is to “provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.”<sup>20</sup>

### Scope

This study is limited to the United States Army Reserve and will not consider other reserve component capabilities in regards to their role in DSCA. The study aims to identify and address the gaps and shortfalls in the doctrine, organization, and training regarding the Army Reserve and its employment of forces in support of DSCA.

### Limitations

Time constraint is a major limitation of the study which will in turn limit the amount of data reviewed and collected. With individual research and resources available one can only begin to touch on all factors involved. This research of course is not the major overarching mission that is currently being discussed amongst our Army leadership with continuing missions abroad. With the impending reduction of forces, budget deficits, and preparing the redeployment of our forces from Afghanistan, an analytical fear is that certain leadership will not respond to my inquiries, thus limiting my topical resources to that of just literature of the written word. Prior research and doctrine will be helpful, though the concern is that doctrine may have been developed without input from the Army Reserve's subject matter experts on DSCA. The focus of this study will cover only the doctrine, organization, and training in the DOTMLPF construct as they relate to the Army Reserve.

### Delimitations

The research will be restricted to the review of policy, directives, doctrine, published reports, and guidance of; United States Executive & Legislative Branch, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and United States Army Reserve resources. Research beyond those listed would provide external opinion to the research and may not provide a suitable basis to the research question, just personal opinion. An additional constraint will be time; therefore research collection is limited to the following time period: 1 September 2013 to 1 April 2014.

## Summary

This study explores the roles and responsibilities associated with the DSCA mission assigned to the DoD. The importance of DSCA missions with 18,500 assigned each day, and rotational units assuming the mission on 1 October each year, is one of great importance to the defense and stability of our nation.<sup>21</sup> The goal is a comprehensive study to promote full understanding of DSCA and the Army Reserve's role.

In order to build that understanding and define the construct, the review of the applicable doctrine will focus on DCSA and the Army Reserve. Knowing the capabilities and limitations will be the overarching goal in the ability to form a conclusion to this study to properly set the study in context with the problem of supporting DSCA in the Army Reserve. The literature review will focus on the following areas: clarification of the terms associated with DSCA, Army Reserve mission and structure, the major players connected with DSCA, brief history of Army Reserve's previous role in DSCA, in depth examination of the processes involved with DSCA functions and what guides them, and all pertinent current research that focuses on programs that relate to in correlation of homeland defense and support of civil authorities. Additionally, the review will also highlight the important role of strategies and frameworks, and how in order to find overall success they must all be interconnected.

An explanation of the methodology used in the research will be described in chapter 3. Chapter 4 will discuss the findings of the qualitative study and outline the primary and secondary research questions that will be doctrinally based. The final chapter will contain the conclusion and recommendations for future research in the field of

DSCA and the Army Reserve's role, and even more specifically, the possible growth of the Army Reserve DSCA capabilities.

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<sup>1</sup>Department of Defense, *DoD Weekly Mobilization Report*, Defense Manpower Data Center, <https://www.defense.gov/documents/Mobilization-Weekly-Report-130910.pdf> (accessed 15 September 2013).

<sup>2</sup>USARNORTH. *Vibrant Response 13-2 Fact Sheet* (Peterson Air Force Base, CO: United States Northern Command, March 2013).

<sup>3</sup>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Interagency Partner Guide* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2013).

<sup>4</sup>Department of Defense, Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3500, *CBRN Response Force (DCRF)*, NORTHCOM, 2011.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Department of Defense, GTA 90-01-20, *Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) Handbook* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011).

<sup>8</sup>Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, [www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc\\_1214592333605.shtml](http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214592333605.shtml) (accessed 20 October 2013).

<sup>9</sup>Department of Defense, United States NORTHCOM, "CBRN Concept Plan" (accessed 15 September 2013).

<sup>10</sup>Department of Defense, Directive Number 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)* (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, September 2012).

<sup>11</sup>New York Times, "Army to Cut its Forces by 80,000 in Five Years," [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/army-to-cut-its-forces-by-80000-in-5-years.html?ref=rayodier&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/army-to-cut-its-forces-by-80000-in-5-years.html?ref=rayodier&_r=0) (accessed 20 October 2013).

<sup>12</sup>Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2012), 10.

<sup>13</sup>Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2013), Glossary.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, *DSCA Interagency Partner Guide*.

<sup>16</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01F, *Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, March 2009).

<sup>17</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, November 2010), 106.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 130.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 131.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 237.

<sup>21</sup>Department of Defense, Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3500.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

The purpose of this literature review is the evaluation of current literature relevant to the thesis. The research examined a broad range of sources to acquire the necessary elements in order to provide a better understanding to the challenges facing the Army Reserve and its role in DSCA. Establishing a methodology of document review is paramount in determining the importance of DSCA in regards to the importance it plays to the nation. This review begins with strategic level documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and progresses it way through National Military Strategies, government reports, doctrine, prior research, articles and journals, and finally a review of the governing laws.

The research will succinctly show the inherent relationship from the strategic level to the tactical level guidance. Identification of gaps or issues will be identified as they relate to the Army Reserve and DSCA. Through the years, exercises and training events have codified the relationships between our military and the civilian authorities supported. The immediate impact these exercises have effected, have identified numerous lessons learned that ensured a change to current doctrine. This chapter will review what is and what is not already known in unclassified resources to support the research question: What will be the Army Reserve's role in DSCA future missions while operating in a resource constrained environment?

### History of the Army Reserve's Role in DSCA

Beginning in 2000, key staff planners in the Army Reserve concluded that a future role in DSCA (Military Support of Civil Authorities (MSCA) at that time) would play a critical role in years to come. These planners determined that there was not a venue currently available to train Army Reserve Soldiers and units in DSCA. The realization that the training required to establish inter-operability with civilian agencies in the time of a crisis would simply be too late after the incident. These visionaries were correct in all aspects of thought and progressed to correct the problem with the creation of the first exercise to train Army forces in DSCA.

In the summer of 2004, Red Dragon exercise began as a non-program of record exercise funded by the Army Reserve internally. This small exercise continues to grow each year, and in 2009 trained approximately 3,000 Soldiers.<sup>1</sup> These exercises have been primarily held at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Ten years of exercises have now been conducted and recently ARNORTH has assimilated into the exercise to provide observer/controller-trainers (OC-Ts) from their Civil Support Training & Assessment Teams. This integrated operating environment has provided highly trained Army Reserve Soldiers for previous, current, and future rotational DSCA missions.

The author has participated in four of these exercises as a Company Commander and Battalion S3. The importance of these exercises have grown enormously. What began as mainly a venue to train CBRN units has morphed to encompass medical, signal, military police, engineer, logistical, chaplaincy, and public affairs units.<sup>2</sup>

The exercise engages first responders, local hospitals, and local metropolitan areas. The 415th Chemical Brigade, located in Greenville, South Carolina, has generally

served as the action agent for the exercise while providing mission command and the construct of the missions. This multi-functional exercise focuses on providing unique and complementary capabilities when effects of a catastrophic event exceeds state civilian and National Guard capabilities. In essence, it is a Year 2 and 3 exercise in the Army Reserve Force Generation Model, though on occasion other units will participate. Units are allocated generally eighteen months out as being identified for future DSCA missions, and have normally participated in at least two Red Dragon exercises.

The end state objectives of this well-scripted scenario called Exercise Red Dragon are as follows: Successfully deploy all assigned units to the exercise location(s), execute intense DSCA training, accomplish successful alerts and rapid responses for DSCA missions, evaluate the operations of higher echelons to joint task force operations as they pertain to DSCA, successfully integrate sustainment into brigade operations, integrate the civil support task force into civilian response operations, complete all training events and mission assignments using evaluations and after-action reviews, and safely redeploy to home stations.<sup>3</sup>

All of the planning involved with these exercises are conducted each year with minimal staffing to high results. The foundational training and experience have been proven over the past ten years in DSCA preparation of the Army Reserve. This exercise has provided key training and hands-on experience to the Soldiers of the Army Reserve. Recent legislation would further define the role of the Army Reserve.

The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA 2012) reduced funding significantly from previous years. Tough decisions will be required at every level of leadership in our armed forces to ensure we meet the mandates of the *National Security*

*Strategy.* DSCA is no different from any other program, but all of our costs to military forces can be reimbursed through strict accounting of each mission assignment. One positive of NDAA 2012 was enabling the federal reserves, such as the Army Reserve, to “provide assistance to states during natural and manmade disasters, and providing authority for governors and designated National Guard officers to exercise control over federal military forces in such disasters.”<sup>4</sup> This change was seen as a positive by many Army Reserve leaders who had previously had to watch as local communities struggled in disasters. Specific examples will be shown in chapter 4 of this IRA process already achieving positive results.

#### United States National Strategy Documents

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the lead document in the strategic management framework for the United States and is required by Title 50 USC 404a. This document provides the vision of the national strategic environment and strategic direction utilizing all elements of national power. A key element addressed in the NSS is the effective management of emergencies. The foundation of emergency management as stated in the NSS, “focuses on building capacity to prepare for disasters, reduce or eliminate long-term effects to people and their property from hazards, and respond to and recover from major incidents.”<sup>5</sup>

Building of the right capabilities to respond to emergencies requires fully integrating domestic hazards at all levels of government. Through collaboration with local and state governments, and encouragement of domestic regionalized planning and preparedness programs, our federal government will be prepared to manage major

disasters. These key efforts are critical to the ongoing safety of the United States and its citizens.<sup>6</sup>

Consequentially, direction is not specifically given on how emergency management will be addressed at the federal level, nor is it expected; given this document in essence is a conceptual framework. The strategic needs addressed do however show the importance of interagency and intergovernmental coordination between the federal, state, and local governments. This overarching document establishes the importance of military forces working in coordination with civilian authorities to achieve national security. This essentially becomes the first document in the basis for DoD's DSCA planning, as the military is a key element of national power.

The President of the United States (POTUS) with the *National Security Strategy*, directs the armed forces to prepare operational plans in defense of the borders of the United States, its territories, and national interests. With that direction, the Secretary of Defense develops the *National Defense Strategy (NDS)*. The NDS provides guidance on priority defense missions and strategic goals for the armed forces in support of the NSS. Direction for DSCA is set forth in the NDS as follows: "U.S. forces will . . . defend U.S. territory from attack. We will come to the assistance of civil authorities; in the event of natural disasters, or a significant or catastrophic event. These events require strong, steady state force readiness . . . threats may be highest when engaged in conflict abroad."<sup>7</sup>

The Secretary of Defense provides further detailed direction through the NDS to the armed forces in regards to assisting domestic civil authorities. However, specific direction is given in broad terms to the total force and not specific to any one element, all

of the armed forces will play a critical role. What that specific role will be is yet to be defined at the strategic level but will become clearer through the strategic management framework. The NDS guidance on priority defense missions and strategic goals provides the overall ENDs and WAYs for our military forces to provide the MEANS.

*The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* is published every four years as mandated by Title 10 USC 118. The *QDR* is a parallel document to the *National Defense Strategy*. The *QDR* is the document that provides direction to the military forces to ensure it meets the strategic direction established by the POTUS. The *QDR* as mandated; provides a strategic framework by reviewing DoD priorities and strategy. Within *QDR* guidance, it is established that “forces must plan and prepare to prevail in a broad range of operations that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping time frames. This includes . . . the need to plan for the broadest possible range of operations—from DSCA, to deterrence and preparedness missions—occurring in multiple . . . combinations.”<sup>8</sup>

Of further importance to this research is that *QDR 2010* clearly emphasizes the criticality of DSCA by making it a top priority. To ensure the correlation with strategic guidance established by the POTUS, the Secretary of Defense mandates a series of specific directives in *QDR 2010* to the force. These specific directives have a direct impact on the Army Reserve due to the nature of the units assigned, and include the following: (1) improve responsiveness and flexibility of consequence management response forces; (2) enhance capabilities for domain awareness; (3) accelerate the development of standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities; and (4) enhance domestic capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs).<sup>9</sup> These directives in turn support the overall direction of the *National Response Framework (NRF)*.

The NRF supports the strategic objectives of the NSS.<sup>10</sup> The Department of Homeland Defense (DHS) is the lead agency for publication of the NRF, though the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the action office in most cases for federal response and execution of the NRF, and is formed into ten regions as stated in chapter 1. The NRF is an essential component of the National Preparedness System mandated in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8: National Preparedness. PPD-8 is aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation. PPD-8 defines five mission areas—Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery—and mandates the development of a series of policy and planning documents to explain and guide the Nation’s collective approach to ensuring and enhancing national preparedness. The NRF sets the doctrine for how the Nation builds, sustains, and delivers the response core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal (the Goal). The Goal establishes the capabilities and outcomes the Nation must accomplish across all five-mission areas in order to be secure and resilient.<sup>11</sup>

The NRF is the over-arching guide as to how the Nation responds to all types of disasters and emergencies.<sup>12</sup> The construct of the NRF is built upon a scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structure to align key roles and responsibilities across the whole community.<sup>13</sup> The NRF is composed of the base document, Emergency Support Functions (ESF) Annexes, Support Annexes, and Incident Annexes. These annexes provide detailed information to assist with the implementation of the NRF.<sup>14</sup> The fifteen ESFs will be further discussed to show the relationship between the NRF and DoD.

The NRF links all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. The intentions of this framework is to capture specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents at the local level, but serious in nature, to larger scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF further details the common discipline and structures that have grown over time at the local, tribal, State, territorial, insular area, and national levels. Key lessons learned from catastrophic natural disasters in the continental United States are described as well. These lessons are primarily focused on how the Federal Government organizes to support local communities and States in catastrophic incidents. This holistic approach emphasizes the need for the involvement of the whole community.<sup>15</sup>

In largely because of DoD's critical role in national defense, its resources are committed only after approval by the Secretary of Defense or at the direction of the President. Many DoD officials are authorized to respond to save lives, protect property, and mitigate human suffering under imminently serious conditions, as well as to provide support under their separate established authorities, as appropriate.<sup>16</sup> This is called Immediate Response Authority (IRA). DoD Directive 3025.18 states: "IRA does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory". When DoD resources are authorized to support civil authorities, command of those forces remains with the Secretary of Defense. DoD elements in the incident area of operations, and the National Guard forces under the command of a governor coordinate closely with response organizations at all levels.<sup>17</sup>

The supporting relationship of DoD begins to become clear in regards to the ESFs. FEMA coordinates response support from across the Federal Government and

certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) by calling up, as needed, ESFs. DoD is the lead coordinator for ESF #3 (Public Works & Engineering) and could be a major contributor in all 15 of the ESFs. The Army Corps of Engineers is the lead DoD organization for ESF #3.<sup>18</sup> Discussion on these findings and analysis will be discussed further in chapter 4.

Inherent to the NRF is the National Incident Management System (NIMS). It is relevant to note that the NRF does not request a specific DoD unit; it does however request a core capability as outlined in NIMS and the supporting ESFs. As stated in the *NRF*, “protocols and structures described in the NRF align with NIMS. NIMS provides a consistent, nationwide template to enable the whole community to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the effects of incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity.”<sup>19</sup>

All of the components of the NIMS—including preparedness, communications and information management, resource management, and command and management—support response at whatever level required.<sup>20</sup> Further, in the NRF it speaks to the concepts involved between multi-agency coordination and unified commands. This command and management component of NIMS is essential to the effective response operations concepts. The importance of these concepts are addressed in the NRF and it states: “develop a single set of objectives; using a collective, strategic approach; improving information flow and coordination; creating a common understanding of joint priorities and limitations; ensuring that no agency’s legal authorities are compromised or neglected; and optimizing the combined efforts of all participants under a single plan.”<sup>21</sup>

To military professionals these concepts should be very familiar. These concepts directly relate to the way planning occurs in military operations, though the terminology may be slightly different, our supporting relationship to civilian authorities should not be difficult to assimilate. This is the overall basis for the NRF and NIMS, integration and cooperation. NIMS is a comprehensive, national approach to incident management. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) requires all Federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS.<sup>22</sup> The “DSCA Interagency Partner Guide” (Appendix B) provides the details in graphic form of the relationships set forth in NIMS and will be further discussed in chapter 4.

Training and preparation are the key to DoD’s response to catastrophic incidents. Though a natural disaster may give forewarning, an act of terrorism does not generally yield a warning. Criticality lies with the ability to immediately mobilize and deploy assets upon the formal request to the SECDEF. Proactive responses are utilized as will be seen further in this study. Creation of joint task forces and identification of units on the DSCA mission will serve as a critical life-saving function of the military in the homeland.

#### United States Military Strategy Documents

National Military Strategy published by the Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as required by Title 10 USC 153, aligns ends, ways, means, and risks with the overall strategic ends of the NSS, NDS, and QDR. This document is in direct support of National Strategy. The SECDEF assesses and provides comments thereon (if any) that shall be included with the report. The overall construct of this document provides a description of the strategic environment, and discusses the challenges and opportunities

that have an immediate impact on U.S. national interest and security. Furthermore, the regional threats to U.S. national interests and security is discussed that include threats on the international level from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

These critical objectives are the cornerstone of U.S. national security and provide a distinct direction to U.S. national military objectives. The stated objectives align to the strategic environment as it pertains to regional and international threats. To provide the strategy, concepts, and elements that allow for the contribution to achieving U.S. national military objectives, the NMS states: “assessment of the capabilities and adequacy of U.S. forces to successfully execute the NMS; and assessment of the capabilities, adequacy, and interoperability of regional allies . . . and friendly nations to support U.S. forces in combat operations and other operations for extended periods of time.”<sup>23</sup> This would include the capability to provide DSCA mission support as required, and would include the evaluation of both the active and reserve component elements.

Key elements as it pertains to this study are the National Military Objectives set forth in *NMS 2011*. The objectives are as follows: Counter Violent Extremism; Deter and Defeat Aggression; Strengthen International and Regional Security; Shape the Future Force.<sup>24</sup> These National Military Objectives have a direct correlation of the DoD’s role in DSCA as they pertain to the homeland. DoD forces daily work in coordination with various federal agencies in order to remove the threat of violence and deter aggression toward our nation. In order to strengthen regional security, the future force must be shaped to meet the needs of national security. Whether it is conducted by NORTHCOM, United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), or PACOM, the overall objective of these commands is the defense of the homeland. The threat from a WMD attack or

natural disaster looms each day. This document ensures focus is determined. As the NMS states: “these core military competencies include complementary, multi-domain power projection, joint forcible entry, the ability to maintain joint assured access to the global commons and cyberspace should they become contested, and the ability to fight and win against adversaries.”<sup>25</sup>

The NMS is the cornerstone for all military strategy documents. In the literature review up to this point, DoD is clearly the center of gravity to the national strategies. Through the military instrument of power, our nation relies heavily on the armed forces to protect our homeland. Through these directives, NORTHCOM has been designated as the lead organization for DoD to provide support to DSCA missions, and prepare a consequence management response force to accomplish CBRN support to civil authorities as well. NORTHCOM has further created JTF-CS, and delegated to this command the mission to train a ready force to support civil authorities if requested through the Secretary of Defense under ARNORTH.

Further definitive guidance is provided by the SECDEF in his *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities*. This document orients the DoD towards an increasingly complex strategic environment. This strategy identifies two priority missions for DoD in the homeland from 2012 to 2020. DoD will work with DHS and other actors to achieve these stated missions: “defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors; and provide assistance to domestic civil authorities in the event of natural or manmade disasters, potentially in response to a very significant or catastrophic event.”<sup>26</sup> Of note is the reinforcement of this strategy in one of the key objectives; develop plans and procedures to ensure DSCA during complex catastrophes.<sup>27</sup>

This definitive guidance has never been placed in a DoD strategy in a document of its own. This focus ensures the on-going priority of DSCA in DoD. It states, “DoD must posture the Total Force to address the new realities facing our nation today.”<sup>28</sup>

Of particular note is the identification of core capabilities in support of the “Provide DSCA” mission, which states: “ready access to non-National Guard Reserve forces.”<sup>29</sup> This statement is directed toward the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserve. These Title 10 forces are readily available to the SECDEF for DSCA missions. It further states, “DoD will develop rules and modalities to execute its authority for involuntary reserve mobilization for response to emergencies in the United States, including natural disasters.”<sup>30</sup> The SECDEF now has the authority for involuntary mobilization of non-National Guard Reservists for domestic disaster response.

Understanding the geographic dispersion of reserve units and their life-saving medical, decontamination, engineering, and other capabilities mandate great consideration of reserve employment for any Total Force response.<sup>31</sup> DoD now will develop, refine, and implement policy that will facilitate rapid approval for reserve activation and employment.<sup>32</sup> These are significant changes in the role the Army Reserve will provide to DSCA from the previous 2005 Strategy.

#### United States Army Strategy Documents

The Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) for 2013 does not specifically mention DSCA as a primary goal, though it is inherent in several specified goals in general. Of note is the near term need for Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). In order for the Army to organize, man, train and equip both the AC and the RC, specific aligned force packages will be established. These force packages will be structured to meet the

requirements set forth by the combatant commander's in the field. Furthermore, it discusses the need for the Army to fully integrate the AC and RC forces, and their capabilities down to the tactical level as appropriate. The integration includes predeployment collective training to fully implement the RAF construct.

In addition, it directs that the Army Commands, and Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) will ensure as stated: "procedures and processes for validating predeployment readiness are uniform for AC and RC units and Soldiers. To enable implementation of the Total Force policy, the Army will streamline the voluntary and involuntary call to active duty of RC personnel and units."<sup>33</sup> The key to this statement is the Secretary of the Army realizes he cannot accomplish the full spectrum of operations with active duty Soldiers alone. The need to fully integrate the Army Reserve into missions, DSCA being one, will be crucial to the success of the RAF construct and long term success of the Army meeting the goals laid forth by the POTUS in the NSS. Further guidance is provided in more detail in the posture statement.

In May 2013, Secretary of the Army, the Honorable John M. McHugh, and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T. Odierno published the 2103 Army Posture Statement. The posture statement covers a brief section on missions at home and support of civil authorities. As stated in this paragraph, the Total Force is prepared to defend the homeland and routinely conducts critical DSCA operations. Furthermore, it states as follows, "this past year demonstrated through wild fires, two major Hurricanes, floods and winter storm emergencies, the Army is always ready to respond to the call of its citizens. . . After Hurricane Sandy struck the eastern United States, more than 22,000 active and reserve component Soldiers, provided immediate and sustained relief."<sup>34</sup> This

posture statement is not as defined to the distinct roles in DSCA as previous versions in the past. Though it does clearly state in the eyes of the Army leaders that our Total Force is ready for a catastrophic event and its role in support of DSCA.

In the 2011 Army Posture Statement, a more defined posture of the force in the immediate future is described. This posture statement discusses the institutionalization and investment needed in the reserve component. The critical need to obtain and provide predictable access to the RC so that the Army can achieve the strategic flexibility and operational depth required to respond to emerging contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. Furthermore, key goals are stated as follows: "...systematically building and sustaining readiness while increasing predictability for RC Soldiers . . . through the ARFORGEN process. We must modify Army policies and update Congressional authorizations in order to fully realize the potential of an operationalized RC and capitalize on their significant combat experience."<sup>35</sup> The statement of the need for an "Operational Army Reserve" reinforces the Total Army concept; setting the stage for how reserve Soldiers will be utilized by the active Army.

Shortly after the 2011 posture statement was published, a detailed information paper was developed that delved into further detail of what the Army has completed in relation to CBRN Consequence Management (CM) preparedness. The establishment of the Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) design enabled the ability of the Army to respond to a catastrophic or CBRN event. The Army would only respond when a Request for Assistance (RFA) by a Governor, Lead Federal Agency, or the President through the Secretary of Defense has been initiated.

Furthermore the vision stated in the paper states: “The Army will continue to properly source, equip, and train forces required to effectively respond to multiple, near-simultaneous domestic CBRNE events as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff CBRN Consequence Management Execution Order.”<sup>36</sup> As a direct result, DoD established a new requirement for a Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) that would be trained and ready to respond to RFAs from civil authorities. Though this is not an entirely new concept, it simply refines the previous CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) capabilities’ to further provide a rapid and flexible CBRN Enterprise.

DCRF as it is does not relegate state, local, or federal authority. What it does do is to support those authorities by providing a DoD response, rescue, relief, and recovery operations capable force where local, state, and federal elements may have shortfalls in a CBRNE catastrophic event.<sup>37</sup> Of special note is the major role the Army plays in the DCRF mission and the number of forces it provides to the standing structure. Since the majority of the sustainment forces are located in the reserve component, its role is quite prominent in the DCRF mission. Without these key warfighting functions in the Army Reserve, it is difficult to determine whether the active component would be successful alone. We will further analyze this in chapter 4.

NORTHCOM is assigned as the lead DoD agency for a CBRN response in the continental United States. Under this guidance NORTHCOM has established a two dimension mission: the first is a general statement that anticipates the requirement to conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within its assigned area or responsibility (AOR) to defend, protect, and secure the U.S. and its interests, and the second is to provide DSCA support during special events and mitigate the effects of a

catastrophic event. PACOM plays a role as well, providing the same support criteria to Hawaii and Pacific Region territories.

The concept plans that cover DoD support to CBRN and DSCA events are CONPLAN 3500<sup>38</sup> and 3501.<sup>39</sup> These documents provide the outline of command relationships and processes required for mission assignment approval for incident response to a DSCA mission. Concurrently details are provided specifically for deployment to a CBRN incident or immediate response into a threatened area. Within the framework of CONPLAN 3500 and 3501, it further specifies the responsibilities of JTF-CS in the event of a CBRN threat or catastrophic event. Analyzing the mission and CONPLANS associated with DSCA have shown the need for the ability to rapidly respond to any number of incidents. With initial response a key element in life saving, JTF-CS is mandated in both CONPLANS to respond initially within 24 hours from notification. In a national emergency, mobilization under the NORTHCOM unified command plan is the ability to assist as quickly as needed for a mass casualty event. In a complex catastrophe, response time is critical. Through the established regionally assigned Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and their assigned Defense Coordinating Elements (DCE) for each of the ten FEMA regions, DoD through NORTHCOM, ARNORTH, and JTF-CS provide an exceptional capability to unified action and the American people.

Preparedness is the key to DSCA, and the actions taken to this point by DoD have been at the forefront of emergency preparedness. Discussion will take place further to identify aspects in chapter 4 as the author provides the overall analysis of the role of the Army Reserve in this construct. The overall Army's strategy will provide a direct impact

on the role of the Army Reserve. Missions that are decidedly inherent to the active force versus those given to the operational Army Reserve have a definitive impact on preparedness and readiness of the force and accomplishment of assigned tasks.

#### United States Army Reserve Strategy Documents

The Army Reserve's strategy provides a direct impact on the overall role of the Operational Army Reserve. Missions directed by the Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command, are those dictated by overall strategy developed in support of the active Army Strategy and requested by FORSCOM. In meeting those overarching goals and responsibilities, the Army Reserve published *2020: Vision & Strategy Statement* in February 2011. In this vision and strategy statement, domestic emergency is discussed. Though this document does not go into finite details, it shows that DSCA is an important role in the Army Reserve. It further states, "... units are positioned in close proximity to areas that may require domestic military support for disaster response or homeland defense."<sup>40</sup>

In March 2013, LTG Jeffrey W. Talley, Chief of Army Reserve, and Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command published his posture statement. The title: *America's Army Reserve: A Life-Saving and Life-Sustaining Force for the Nation*, speaks loudly to his vision and direction of the force. Talley states:

NDAA 2012 allows Army Reserve Soldiers' valuable military- and civilian-acquired skills and capabilities to now be leveraged at home for critical lifesaving, property preservation and damage mitigation events. The new mobilization authority for DSCA serves as the mechanism to activate Federal Reserve Components during a catastrophe, as demonstrated by the Army Reserve's rapid response to aid the victims of Hurricane Sandy. The core competency of the Army Reserve lends itself readily to such missions. The Army Reserve is also part of the DCRF, maintaining mission-ready Soldiers and equipment available for deployment in the event of a national emergency or disaster.<sup>41</sup>

LTG Talley clearly understands the prominence of the role of the Army Reserve in DSCA. His overarching guidance to the formations of his units shows the criticality of the missions and long-term establishment of success in support of our nations' populace. With his experience as a reserve engineer officer, he knows firsthand of the capabilities that can be brought forth in disaster response by his formations.

Increasing complex demands for the future require continued reliance on the reserve component. The global fiscal environment brings growing security challenges to our nation and our coalition partners, necessitating a balance between identifying efficiencies and the continued engagement of a ready, agile and adaptable force. Specifically this posture statement provides insight into homeland operations; Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and DSCA. The Army Reserve currently provides seven aviation units in support of the DCRF. These units work directly with their active-duty counterparts as the initial Title 10 response force for CBRN or terrorist incidents.

Responding to DSCA situations, the Army Reserve provides Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) personnel. These Soldiers conduct valuable operations at the federal, state and local emergency operations centers during all phases of incident management operations. The Army Reserve provides access to additional incident response forces including, but not limited to, the following types of units: CBRN, medical, aviation, transportation, engineering, communications and logistics. These capabilities can be packaged with appropriate command and staff structure to facilitate assistance to civil authorities. This packaging also provides necessary mission command to Title 10 Department of Defense resources in a defined joint environment.<sup>42</sup>

Furthermore, specific guidance is given in regards to funding and preparedness in the posture statement as follows:

The FY 14 Army Reserve's budget according to the request, properly funds the operational reserve to ensure the force structure required for homeland operations. The requirement to maintain a specific portion of our Soldiers on duty to support DCRF mission response time is critical to mission accomplishment and success. The national level response goal is to save lives and conduct search-and-rescue operations in the first 72 hours of an incident, requiring immediate access to Army Reserve forces for these critical missions. Resourcing to purchase and maintain specialized commercial off-the-shelf equipment facilitates interoperability between the Army Reserve forces employed at an incident location with federal, state, and local first responders.<sup>43</sup>

The specificity of this posture statement has never before occurred in the Army Reserve according to the research in this study. This statement clearly shows the understanding of DSCA and the need to properly budget for success. In-depth analysis of how the Army Reserve plans DSCA preparation will occur in chapter 4.

#### Government Organization Reports

The decisions in Congress have a direct tie to funding made available to the DSCA missions. When the Government Accountability Office (GAO) receives a Congressional request for information, a report is generated by that request that normally delves into systems or procedures within the federal government. The goal of these reports are generally engaged for deeper understanding for members of Congress or committees. The stated mission of the GAO is “to provide support to Congress in their role of meeting its constitutional responsibilities, . . . improve the performance . . . , and ensure accountability of the federal government, and for the benefit of the American people. Providing Congress timely information that is objective, fact-based, non-partisan, non-ideological, fair, and balanced.”<sup>44</sup>

GAO has published numerous reports on the progress and current status of DSCA. The vast amount of reports will limit this research in evaluating the reports that speak directly to the role of the Army Reserve in DSCA. This method will ensure that the research continues to remain focused on interoperability and effectiveness.

Of particular note is a report GAO published in July 2013 titled *Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers*. This report covered how personnel are organized, different categories of the reserve component, how they are utilized, compensation, legal protections, and recent changes in pay and benefits.<sup>45</sup> This report comes at a time of much concern of the drawdown of active forces, and ensuring that our military can still meet the requirements of the NSS. A section of the report covers disaster response activation. It briefly describes the involuntary activation authorized under NDAA FY 2012 of federal reserve forces to active duty for up to 120 days when a governor requests federal assistance.<sup>46</sup> With this information now with members of Congress, our elected officials have a better understanding of what the reserve component can offer in DSCA.

Another GAO report analyzed the critical relationship between the warfighting and DSCA roles of military forces. In this March 2010 report titled, *DoD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities during Disasters*, the report shows a less than acceptable role by DoD forces in response to Hurricane Katrina. Certain parts of the report seem to have few details identified from a DoD perspective with ground truth from the event. Though the report shows that federal forces that responded, by GAO assessment, were not prepared for a DSCA response of that magnitude.<sup>47</sup>

The report further addresses DoD capability gaps for DSCA missions, the need to have clearly defined roles and responsibilities, and the sharing and tracking of information. This report reviewed standing guidance within DoD at the time and worked to coordinated understanding with FEMA as the lead agency.<sup>48</sup> GAO made recommendations in this study that DoD update its DSCA guidance to reflect current doctrine. It further discusses a manpower survey for DCOs, and the ability to track RFAs across DoD that would be accessible to interagency partners.<sup>49</sup> A missed opportunity in this incident was the unused critical Army Reserve assets within the FEMA region.

The final GAO report of significance to this study was a report from September 2009. This report titled *U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved*, covers the need for a common operational approach between all stakeholders. This particular report covers the topic of a CBRN DSCA event. Gaps identified by lack of coordination and understanding increases the interoperable capability of military forces in response to a DSCA event. It further recommends that: “DoD must make proper coordination, and ensuring of coordinated resources between FEMA and other jurisdictional entities for the overall success of the missions assigned. DSCA partners must integrate to achieve the one common goal.”<sup>50</sup> Though this report does not mention the reserve component directly, these lessons were put in place at future Vibrant Response exercises were reserve component elements participated. These lessons learned would become further building blocks for DoD in their DSCA response missions.

### Joint Doctrine

A review of Joint Doctrine will provide understanding to the diverse roles of each of the components in the DSCA mission under the DoD. This review focuses on the specific role of the Army and Army Reserve and assigned capabilities to meet the intent of their directives. The overarching Joint Doctrine as it relates to this area of study is Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*. The current revision dated July 2013 updates the definitions of several key terms, clarifies the role and authorities of the military in support to civil authorities, and describes fully the importance of the NRF.

As the JP states: “The domestic operating environment in which DSCA is performed, relies on the ability of the military commander to work with other government and nongovernment agencies and organizations. A range of domestic responses is provided by the AC and RC.”<sup>51</sup> This is key, as the domestic operating environment is one that most reserve component members operate in during their civilian capacities. It further states, “DOD resources are provided only when response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of local, state, and federal civil authorities, and when they are requested by a federal agency with lead responsibility and approved by SecDef. An exception to this is in the case of immediate response authority (IRA).”<sup>52</sup> Directives also support this foundational doctrine.

Department of Defense Directive 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (DSCA) further discusses IRA and states: “When requested by civil authorities, commanders can respond to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions within the US.”<sup>53</sup> We have

discussed IRA previously, the key to this JP is it has been updated to ensure leaders understand that role, and the role of the reserve component in IRA, understanding units are geographically dispersed throughout the country.

Of note is the discussion in the section on Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs). EPLO positions are authorized in each FEMA region and state from the Title 10, USC, reserve forces.<sup>54</sup> Many EPLOs currently assigned are Army Reserve officers. The JP further discusses their distinct role and states: “EPLOs provide DOD liaison with FEMA . . . facilitate planning, coordination, and training for DSCA and national security emergency preparedness, advise federal agencies and organizations on DOD capabilities and resources, advocate mutual support required by DOD, and, on order, augment DOD response for DSCA.<sup>55</sup> Department of Defense Instruction 3025.16, Defense Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Programs, established the EPLO program. The EPLOs are embedded within USARNORTH’s 10 DCEs and operate under the direction of a DCO to perform HD and DSCA missions.

The JP further establishes the specific requirements and responsibilities of the EPLOs and states in the JP that, “EPLOs are senior RC officers. EPLOs are activated . . . at the request of the supported CCDR. EPLOs advise civil authorities on military resources and capabilities and facilitate coordination between civil authorities and DOD during state or federal exercises or DSCA operations.”<sup>56</sup> EPLOs are uniquely trained in emergency management and DSCA operations. The JP is the precise guidance in DoD doctrine in regards to DSCA. This doctrine continues the directional efforts of the DoD to fully integrate reserve component assets into the Total Army. This foundational DSCA

Joint Doctrine further sets the cornerstone for Army Doctrine in regards to its service specific preparedness and response.

### Army Doctrine

Review of Army Doctrine begins with Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. The ADRPs augment doctrine established in Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs) and provide expanded discussion on the capstone guidance provided in the ADPs. Since this research is focused on DSCA, those specific details are essential to the study. ADRP 3-0 provides the force the foundation for the Army's operational concept of unified land operations (ULO) and was the first ADRP released under Doctrine 2015.<sup>57</sup>

Understanding the Army's transformation to unified land operations is key to the overall support of DSCA as it relates to decisive action. In order to man, equip, and train the force for a full range of military operations (ROMO), leaders must fully understand the operational environment (OE). An area of interest in the OE for example to a DSCA operation could be much greater than that of an offensive or defensive operation.<sup>58</sup> Working in coordination with a collected effort with unified action partners will be critical in every DSCA mission. Constructive use of combined arms as a force multiplier, to include the reserve component, will be crucial to the overall mission end state success of the Army in DSCA operations.<sup>59</sup>

As the ADRP states: "Operations require versatile, adaptive units and tough, flexible leadership. These qualities develop primarily from training that prepares individuals and units for challenging operational environments. . . It prepares Soldiers and units to address ambiguities inherent in DSCA tasks as well."<sup>60</sup> This doctrine does

not segregate between active or reserve Soldiers, it simply provides direction for the Total Army. So therefore it could be affirmed that the only distinction is that between full-time and part-time. However, it does mention that tasks for DSCA require dedicated training, very similar to offensive and defensive tasks, through intensive training to attain proficiency.<sup>61</sup> This element may require additional training time for reserve units.

Under tasks of decisive action for Army units, DSCA as one of the four core elements requires the following to be provided: support for domestic disasters, support for domestic CBRN incidents, support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies, and other designated support.<sup>62</sup> These have all been previously cited at joint doctrine level, and the Army simply reinforces its immediate priorities to the force. Keeping in line with the stated tasks, the purposes are stated as follows: “save lives, restore essential services, maintain or restore law and order, protect infrastructure and property, maintain or restore local government, and shape the environment for interagency success.”<sup>63</sup>

These tasks and purposes provide the foundation for the Army in DSCA operations. To accomplish these tasks the Army requires units to be proficient in their mission essential task lists (METL) assigned. DSCA missions require a variance in training to provide effective support to civilian authorities. This element of training between wartime and domestic support training has been predominately cyclic in nature over the past 12 years. Units however will not just be assigned without validation of their METL for DSCA contingencies.

Army Regulation 220-1, *Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies* provides specific statistical minimum requirement for a unit to deploy to any environment or operation. The overview description states, “the process is

a structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commander requirements.”<sup>64</sup>

These minimum requirements are calculated in a program called *NETUSR*.

This automated program calculates the areas of personnel available, equipment readiness, training conducted, and overall unit readiness. These factors are then calculated in numerical form from one to four. Mission readiness level one would be a fully capable unit, and level four would be a non-capable unit. Utilizing these factors, and the commander’s subjective assessment, a category is assigned to assess the overall readiness of the unit for a specific mission. The available force pool of units for a DSCA mission apportioned to NORTHCOM would be based on the above-mentioned criteria. Units not at the appropriate mission readiness level would not assume the mission. These standards are Army wide and not just relevant to active or reserve.

ADRP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, provides more specific in-depth guidance the Army in regards to support of civil authorities. Direction is given for the purposes and characteristics of support, organization for support, and tasks of decisive action in regards to the Army’s role in DSCA. This doctrine builds on ADP 3-28, *DSCA*, and explains how the Army, including the Army Reserve, conducts DSCA missions as part of unified land operations.<sup>65</sup> This specific ADRP uses standard terminology and principles from NIMS and the NRF to ensure collective understanding in missions assigned.

Of keynote to this research is the specificity mentioned of the Army Reserve. The ADRP states that, “units of the Army Reserve contain capabilities likely to be needed by

DSCA, such as logistics, medical, construction, and bridging capabilities . . . the Army Reserve is distributed across the states and territories. Traditionally, the Army Reserve has not been organized for domestic operations, but it has been available for sourcing of . . . national emergencies.”<sup>66</sup> These factors begin to illuminate the positive and negative aspects of the Army Reserve. Though it clearly states the Army Reserve has critical capabilities needed for DSCA, and their locations being a positive factor, they have not traditionally been organized for domestic operations. Another possible negative is location of personnel. Army Reserve Soldiers could live upwards of 50 miles from their unit home station. In this case, response times could be critical.

It does however further codify the change to chapter 1209 of Title 10, USC. The amendment if 2012 that allows the full use of Army Reserve Forces for DSCA.<sup>67</sup> As previously noted, this change brought forth the Army Reserve into a key role for the Army in DSCA planning.

It further mentions the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) organization. Under this organization, the Deputy position manned by a Lieutenant Colonel under the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)<sup>68</sup>, in recent years have been filled with numerous Army Reserve, Active Guard Reserve (AGR), officers. This effort shows integration into the Total Force. These positions play a critical role in DoDs preparedness and response to a catastrophic event. As the active force continues to decrease, Army Reserve Soldiers could continue to fill some of the DCE positions to further expand its role.

Of further note is the role of the Army Reserve in the PACOM AOR. United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC) is the ASCC assigned to PACOM.<sup>69</sup> USARCPAC commands Army forces in the Asia-Pacific region and provides training support to Army

Reserve forces in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and America Samoa, as well as DSCA response to those areas.<sup>70</sup> The Army Reserve provides a Major General (MG) as the Deputy Commanding General, Army Reserve.<sup>71</sup>

The Army Reserve provides a subordinate one-star command to USARPAC as well in the 9TH Mission Support Command, Fort Shafter Flats, Hawaii. This command provides USARPAC an Army Reserve force multiplier for unified land operations, and a DSCA enhanced mission capability.<sup>72</sup> The commands units are located throughout the PACOM AOR. Its units have participated multiple exercises, and provide personnel to the PACOM formed Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense.

In short Army leaders as stated in ADRP 3-38: “ensure that Army units supporting civil authorities in the homeland are guided by three core purpose; save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property.”<sup>73</sup> Though these three core principles seem straight forward, DSCA can be a complex mission if units are not properly trained.

### Summary

DSCA can be a complex and mostly ignored operational concept until needed. By focusing this study on what is important from the author’s perspective in regards to the strategic and operational aspects of DSCA, the author’s goal is to provide an insight not approached previously. From the review of national to military strategies, doctrine, previous research, and journals and articles, an increased understanding is developed of how this all relates into the Army Reserve as it is missioned in DSCA. The literature gives us the overall written knowledge on how the DoD performs DSCA, but true analysis in the study will provide the why. As the doctrine and literature has shown, the

Army Reserve plays a critical role in DSCA, but that further analysis will provide the answer to the questions.

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<sup>1</sup>LTC Michael S. Vail, “Exercise Red Dragon 2009,” *Army Chemical Review* (Summer 2009): 42.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 43.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>United States Congress, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2011).

<sup>5</sup>The White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 18.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, June 2010), 5.

<sup>8</sup>Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, February 2010), 12.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 5.

<sup>11</sup>Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, May 2013), 1.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 31.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5.

<sup>23</sup>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, February 2011), 1.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>26</sup>Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, February 2013), 1.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013*, 10.

<sup>34</sup>Department of the Army, *2013 Army Posture Statement*, [https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS\\_ArmyPostureStatement/2013/information\\_papers/index.asp](https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2013/information_papers/index.asp) (accessed 17 November 2013), 4.

<sup>35</sup>Department of the Army, *2011 Army Posture Statement*, [https://securewebeed2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS\\_ArmyPostureStatement/2011/information\\_papers/index.asp](https://securewebeed2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2011/information_papers/index.asp) (accessed 17 November 2013), 8.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>38</sup>Department of Defense, Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3500.

<sup>39</sup>Department of Defense, Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3501, *Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, 2009.

<sup>40</sup>United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), *2020: Vision and Strategy Statement* (Fort Bragg, NC: Headquarters, United States Army Reserve Command, February 2011), 6

<sup>41</sup>USARC, *2013 Posture Statement*, iii.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Government Accountability Office, “About,” <http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html> (accessed 21 October 2013).

<sup>45</sup>Congressional Research Service, *Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 2013), summary.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>47</sup>Government Accountability Office, *DoD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities during Disasters* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, June 2008), 3.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 2009), 5.

<sup>51</sup>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*. (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, July 2013), 1-2.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., I-7.

<sup>53</sup>Department of Defense, Directive Number 3025.18.

<sup>54</sup>CJCS, JP 3-28, 2-13.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 2-13.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, May 2012), iii.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., 1-13.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., 1-15.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 2-5.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, *Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration—Consolidated Policies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2010), 28.

<sup>65</sup>Department of the Army, ADRP 3-28, iii.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 2-7.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 2-15.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., 3-3.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., 3-5.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Department of the Army, “U.S. Army Pacific Homepage,” <http://www.army.mil/info/organization/unitsandcommands/commandstructure/usarpac/> (accessed 30 December 2013).

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Department of the Army, ADRP 3-28, 2-1.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Readers of good books, particularly books of biography and history, are preparing themselves for leadership. Not all readers become leaders, but all leaders must be readers.

— President Harry S. Truman, Post Presidential Papers, Desk File

#### Introduction

The key inquiry of this research study, as stated in the primary research question is, What will be the Army Reserve's role in DSCA future missions while operating in a resource-constrained environment? Furthermore, the secondary research questions: How would the Army Reserve accomplish this mission with limited time and resources, and How could the Army Reserve man, equip, and train forces required to proactively and comprehensively support operations during DSCA events?

In addition, the research aims to discover what gaps may exist in this assessment to gain an increased role, if feasible at all. Previous studies have not targeted the specific discussion to the overall research questions asked above. These studies are the basis for conducting this further analysis of the Army Reserve's future role in the DSCA mission capabilities.

For instance, in the GAO study, *Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers*, a quote provided in the year 2000 from Charles Cragin, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs that states: “The role of our reserve forces is changing in the United States. We have seen their traditional role, which was to serve as manpower replacements in the event of some cataclysmic crisis, utterly transformed.

They are no longer serving as the force of last resort, but as vital contributors on a day-to-day basis around the world.”<sup>1</sup> His comments, made prior to the attacks on 11 September 2001, are now unequivocally factual with the large reserve mobilizations that have occurred in the years since.

By maintaining an unbiased researched methodology, the author seeks to find the statutory truth in answering the focus of this study. By doing so, it is the intent of the author to bring forth a thorough qualitative literature review, an academically based conclusion and recommendation, one that may not be of popular belief.

### Research Design

The research design selected will be qualitative and literature based, primarily on a review of all material collected. This analysis and interpretation must bring forth order and understanding. Ellen Taylor-Powell and Marcus Renner from the University of Wisconsin will base selection of the criteria to follow in this qualitative design on an article, *Analyzing Qualitative Data*. Though this design provides a suggested framework, it requires the ability to be creative, disciplined, and follow a systematic approach.<sup>2</sup> The research design is often referred to as content analysis. This research design was selected to draw conclusions from the method based on the view of the researcher’s experiences from executing the DSCA mission and not on quantitative data. Critical of note is that this research method could quite possibly not be robust enough to acquire sufficient data. To ensure the ability to draw adequate conclusions, the researcher should be aware to not limit the scope of the study to finite.

This analysis process follows a five-step process. Step one of the process is understanding your collected data. Ensuring this data focuses specifically on the research

topic, and documenting the sources.<sup>3</sup> The second step is to focus the analysis by question or topic, time period or event.<sup>4</sup> This step can be accomplished by utilizing the primary and secondary research questions in the study. Step three is to categorize the information collected. This has been accomplished in this study by a systematic approach in the research of strategy, doctrine, journals & articles, and governing laws.<sup>5</sup> The forth step is the identification of patterns and connections within and between categories.<sup>6</sup> The nesting of information accomplishes this as it relates to the research questions. The final step is the interpretation of the data and bring it all together, in this study, which will be accomplished chapter 5.

The inherent disadvantages of this qualitative research design are that the bias of the researcher can play a role in the conclusions ascertained. Conclusions drawn by this study are subject to interpretation as they can be slightly subjective in nature, dependent on the experience of the researcher. Despite these disadvantages, it is the goal of this study to present an unbiased view of the primary and secondary research questions, and to draw conclusions based on the researched data.

This research design process will first be guided in the review of literature from unclassified data to ensure future use to a broader audience. Ensuring the analysis focuses on the quality of the data to ensure its validity in this research to allow for an enhanced subjectivity of the process. Secondly, the focus will be with key concepts to analyze and generate subordinate questions that facilitate the research process. Thirdly, the information will be categorized using a hierarchical method to analyze from the perspective of the three levels of war; Strategic, Operational, Tactical. This process will

start with the National Security Strategy and progress its way down to Army Reserve tactical units and their execution of DSCA.

#### Background Document Review

The analysis and in-depth review of United States Strategic documents; this research conducts a hierarchical review of documents from the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels as they pertain to the Army Reserve and its role in DSCA. The overall research will transition from the analysis of national strategy documents to military strategy documents in support of national objectives. Focus then will begin to analyze Army service strategies and doctrine. This methodology will connect the hierarchy of literature review from Strategic to Tactical, and emphasize the criticality placed on DSCA by the United States government. The answer of how it does or does not transcend to the Army Reserve and its execution of DSCA will be the ultimate objective.

The methodology of this process will be the utilization of the United States Department of Defense Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS). The JCIDS process provides a solution that considers involving any combination of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). By addressing the discovery of material in the literature in this process, the author will be able to formulate the findings and analysis into the conclusion of this research.<sup>7</sup> However, the primary focus of this study will be the first three elements of DOTMLPF: doctrine, organization, and training. The final four DOTMLPF elements of: material, leadership, personnel, and facilities will be discussed for areas for further research in chapter 5.

The DOTMLPF model provides combatant commanders a means to define specific requirements in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The model enables the analysis of gaps in the construct of strategic direction for the total United States military force structure. It also influences the direction of requirements earlier in the acquisition process. It is a focus point for staff planners to consider certain critical issues and requirements prior to undertaking a new effort.<sup>8</sup>

In terms of how analysis is derived in the DOTMLPF model<sup>9</sup> for this research, it will be based on this overall concept for our findings and analysis in chapter 4 as follows:

1. Doctrine: the role defined by strategy, doctrine, laws, policies, and regulations that the Army Reserve supports DSCA operations.
2. Organization: how the Army Reserve units are organized to support DSCA, and if this structure is in line with doctrine.
3. Training: how Army Reserve units train and prepare to assume DSCA missions, with the focus to become interoperable with civilian agencies.

The concept of this model is to correct the capability gaps and build flexibility thereby creating an adaptable force structure to meet requirements. This research study focuses on the role of the Army Reserve in DSCA and will conclude whether the organization structure is able to meet the operational needs of the requested capabilities through NIMS. This design methodology will only be utilized for the role of the Army Reserve whether assigned to USNORTHCOM or USPACOM in support of DSCA.

#### **DOTMLPF Model Explanation and Design**

Each aspect of DOTMLPF, though critically important, will not be under consideration in the course of this study due to its specificity and time constraints. In

order to conduct this research analysis utilizing the DOTMLPF model, it is critical to define the elements and further converse on the criticality of each element as it pertains to this field of study. Each definition will provide the construct to bring forth conclusions in regards to the capabilities of the Army Reserve to be drawn. The overall criteria set forth to evaluate the elements of DOTMLPF are the capstone component that allows the answering of the questions addressed in this study. As previously stated the focus will be narrowed to doctrine, organization, and training.

Doctrine is the first category within the DOTMLPF model to be evaluated. Doctrine in this research will focus on the military aspect of the Army Reserve's support to DSCA. Doctrine is built on history, theory, and experience. In the past year, Army Doctrine has gone through a metamorphosis in its approach to quickly push updates, and new constructs to the field. This enhanced approach will only serve to improve our Total Army construct. Doctrine is defined as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”<sup>10</sup>

Doctrine provides planners a line of departure, which can guide the analysis of a situation or problem. Though Doctrine is not military strategy, it does provide a construct of fundamental principles for military forces to support national objectives. Utilizing doctrine will support this research by establishing the baseline of the designed capabilities for the Army Reserve's role in DSCA.<sup>11</sup>

By reviewing doctrine as it affects the Army Reserve and the role it plays in DSCA, the author will evaluate using the criteria of interoperability, completeness, and feasibility. Interoperability will address how the doctrine states the Army Reserve will be

able to conduct DSCA missions alongside their active component and joint forces.

Completeness will address the doctrine in a way to describe the ability of the Army

Reserve to meet all aspects of the mission set of DSCA. This will include operational

fundamentals, planning factors, and sustainment operations.

The issue that has always been brought to the forefront is doctrine defines how to accomplish the mission in very broad terms, but it has lacked in how long it took to effect changes to the field. Taking advantage of recently updated DSCA doctrine allows for proper up to date evaluation of the meaning of the current doctrine, and whether or not research will make an immediate impact on the field. So the key of answering our research questions will seem to be as simple as, “based on current doctrine; can the Army Reserve perform an increased role in DSCA?” If these general criteria is met, then the doctrine should have enough specificity to allow growth in the future for the Army Reserve for this mission set.

If doctrine drives the military, then it should seem that these organizations should be able to effectively change to meet new doctrine in a timely manner. The next step would be organization. Organizational structure is defined by doctrine. Organizations in the military are hierarchical in structure, meaning each unit in the structure is based on a required capability to meet an overall objective.<sup>12</sup> The analytical evaluation of the Army Reserve organizational structure by the author will allow for proper evaluation to ensure the structure can meet the requirements of the DSCA missions. Evaluating the organization in terms of mission, capability of assets, and the command structure in place to provide mission command should determine if gaps or shortfalls have been properly

identified.<sup>13</sup> These gaps or shortfalls can be of great detriment to assigned missions in support of civil authorities.

Training is the third element in the DOTMLPF model. Analysis of how Army Reserve units prepare to assume DSCA missions and train to become interoperable with civilian agencies will be researched. Can training be accomplished at home station and during exercises to prepare these units for success? An objective view has to be taken here, as the reserve component does not have 365 days a year to train. Objectively looking at the amount of unit training time currently available will show approximately 36 days on average available each year per Soldier. With the available time for unit training and joint exercises, how would the Army Reserve meet the challenging requirements?

### Summary

The goal of this study is an examination of the role of the Army Reserve in support of DSCA. Our national security remains as the Presidents top priority.<sup>14</sup> To protect national security, our people, and critical infrastructure, we have established DSCA as a means to support civil authorities with military forces.<sup>15</sup> Placing at the hands of Soldiers the means to save lives, and mitigate loss of the American people is no easy task. The significant importance of DSCA operations is found not only in its own Army doctrine, but also in ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, which provides a common operational concept for future military operations and includes DSCA as a decisive action. The threat has changed dramatically.

These foundations will drive how units and organizations are designed in support of DSCA. The predominant goal is to analyze the doctrine, organization, and training,

while providing areas of future research for materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities of the Army Reserve to conclude what future role could exist. With an understanding of the operational environment, experience, and qualitative research, an un-based analysis based on literature and previous research will define the role of the Army Reserve as the author sees it. This methodology will address the gaps and weaknesses if they are found to exist. However, due to the time restraints of this research, full analysis of each portion will not be feasible. It is the author's goal to provide at minimum an overview for each step in the DOTMLPF analysis. Thorough description of this study will be presented in the next chapter.

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<sup>1</sup>Congressional Research Service, *Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers*, 9.

<sup>2</sup>Ellen Taylor-Powell and Marcus Renner, *Analyzing Qualitative Data* (University of Wisconsin, Madison Wisconsin, 2003), 1.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>7</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction 3170.01F.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, 83.

<sup>11</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction 3170.01F.

<sup>12</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, 277.

<sup>13</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction 3170.01F.

<sup>14</sup>The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 1.

<sup>15</sup>CJCS, JP 3-28, 2-13.

## CHAPTER 4

## ANALYSIS

### Introduction

The objective of this research study remains to examine the role of the United States Army Reserve in support of DSCA. The scope of this study remains limited to the Army Reserve and has not considered other reserve component capabilities in regards to their role in DSCA. The purpose of the study through the literature review was to identify and address the gaps and shortfalls in doctrine, organization, and training. This narrowed focus continues to be the Army Reserve, and its employment of forces in support of DSCA. This research could be helpful to both NORTHCOM and PACOM in their determinations of missions set forth for Army Reserve units in the future. Furthermore, it could also assist Army Reserve planners in understanding the requirements set forth from civilian authorities and assist them in key decisions in regards to doctrine, organization, and training.

This chapter will present the information derived by the research design of qualitative data techniques applied to the primary research question: What will be the Army Reserve's role in Defense Support of Civil Authorities future missions while operating in a resource-constrained environment? Furthermore, this chapter will address the analysis of the secondary research questions: How would the Army Reserve accomplish this mission with limited time and resources, and how could the Army Reserve man, equip, and train forces required to proactively and comprehensively support operations during DSCA events? The summarization of the data offered in this

chapter will be applied to draw applicable conclusions in the last chapter of this document, Conclusions and Recommendations.

The construct of the research method utilized during this study was primarily a document review analysis concentrating on the Doctrine, Organization, and Training elements of the DOTMLPF model. This analysis assesses the manner in which the Army Reserve supports DSCA during a catastrophic event or presidential call-up. Forces historically apportioned to DoD's standing task forces of Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) and Command and Control CBRN Response Element (C2CRE) have continued to be a key element in DSCA. This study was constrained due to the dependence on document review and the inability to conduct an intricate analysis in the field based on the time constraints and limitations.

The primary research question asks what will be the Army Reserve's role in DSCA future missions be while operating in a resource-constrained environment. The answer can be concluded through the examination of DoD's DSCA missions, and how DSCA has evolved to meet the requirements set forth by Congress. The effectiveness of NORTHCOM, PACOM, and their subordinate commands have led to an increased awareness of the importance of DSCA, and how DoD plays a very critical role in its success. Reduction in the active duty forces will potentially lead to an increased role for the Army Reserve; furthermore, creating a force multiplier for DoD and the Army.

### Doctrine

Military doctrine is intended to sufficiently cover the projected topic for whatever area deemed a requirement to have a written guide. In cases where the intent is not met, additional military doctrine can be written to adequately cover any shortfalls to the

intended topic. This process can be completed with changes to the original doctrine, or in some cases, complete re-writes are required as the operational environment changes. In a broad sense our doctrine from a strategic, operational, or tactical level must portray the needed depth and breadth to ensure success of the organizations in the field.

This research finds the doctrine regarding the topic of the Army Reserve's role in DSCA is complete, even though this has an essential impact to additional elements of this study. Analysis in this research transcends from strategic to operational, and then will touch on the tactical level as it pertains to doctrine. The laws of the land provide the overarching template for our strategic strategy, which in turn leads to the development of the military's doctrine.

The Constitution, statutes, and policy define the role of DoD and its assigned forces in regards to DSCA. Analysis of these laws can constitute a separate study, so this analysis will only provide an overview. The first law addressed is the Posse Commitatus Act, which limits the role of federal forces. Posse Commitatus in general terms prohibits Title 10 federal forces from enforcing any state or federal laws, except those otherwise authorized by law.<sup>1</sup> This law precludes federal forces under Title 10 from making arrests, examining suspects, searches and seizures, or domestic surveillance, but does not preclude support to civilian law enforcement agencies with exceptions.<sup>2</sup>

The exception to the Posse Commitatus Act is the Insurrection Act.<sup>3</sup> This act allows the President to utilize federal forces to enforce laws in three occurrences: request of a state legislature or governor; enforce federal law when events preclude law through judicial proceedings; and suppress insurrection, domestic violence, or conspiracy to

protect the Constitutional rights of citizens. The law provides examples of the situations that the President may invoke the authority of the act.<sup>4</sup>

The President is authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to formally issue major disaster or emergency declarations for response to catastrophic events that overwhelm local, state, or tribal governments.<sup>5</sup> The Economy Act governs federal agencies and permits them to provide required resources and critical services to other federal agencies, but requires precise record keeping, on a reimbursable basis.<sup>6</sup>

The Stafford Act provides the statutory guidance and authority for DSCA operations and specific regulatory guidance to DoD forces.<sup>7</sup> Under this guidance, Title 10 federal forces can perform only defined tasks. These tasks are referred to as “mission assignments” or MAs. As stated previously the RFA process generates MAs based upon ESFs. Once these RFAs are reviewed and vetted, the SecDef will approve or deny the request.<sup>8</sup>

All of these laws mentioned provide the framework to allow for Title 10, Army Reserve forces to conduct DSCA. An article published in *Warrior Citizen Magazine*, by CPT Dan Marchik titled, “Army Reserve participates in Homeland Disaster Response Exercise,” provides an overview of Exercise Patriot 13. In July 2013, Army Reserve units participated for the first time in the exercise’s history.<sup>9</sup> This DSCA exercise enabled National Guard and Army Reserve units to work hand-in-hand with state agencies. These efforts were made available due largely to the NDAA 2012, where states can now request assistance from federal military resources such as the Army Reserve. The exercise was held at Volk Field, part of Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.<sup>10</sup> These joint exercises will only lead

to further training among the reserve component in support of DSCA, and would not be possible without the recent change in the law. These laws provide the legalities for the Army Reserve to conduct DSCA missions, and without that clear understanding, their role would not be defined. Without laws, our national and military strategies would have no funding.

In chapter two, the literature review begins with United States National Strategy documents. The NSS was the first document reviewed. Though this strategic document does not specifically mention the reserve component, it states that the foundation of emergency management should, “focus on building capacity to prepare for disasters, reduce or eliminate long-term effects to people and their property from hazards, and respond to and recover from major incidents.”<sup>11</sup> The construct for emergency management preparedness is the *National Incident Management System Framework* (Appendix D). In this framework, NORTHCOM and PACOM are the lead organizations for DoD, and are depicted in the regional and national levels. If an incident requires Title 10 response, the Army Reserve could respond upon order to either command.

DSCA is clearly one of the most critical roles for the nation’s military as the NSS directs the armed forces to defend the borders of the United States, its territories, and national interests. The NSS directs the NDS. In the NDS, the Secretary of Defense does not specify the use of the Army Reserve, but clearly understands the magnitude of DSCA and the role the armed forces providing in assistance to domestic civil authorities. The QDR, NRF, and NIMS all support the priorities established in the NSS. These documents provide the defined guidance to the armed forces, and continue to support the DSCA mission goal to provide the critical life-saving functions of the military in the homeland.

United States Military Strategy documents provide further distinct direction to the armed forces. In the NMS, the CJCS aligns ends, ways, means, and risks with the overall strategic ends of the NSS, NDS, and QDR. The NMS is the cornerstone for all further military strategy documents. In the literature review, DoD forces are clearly the center of gravity to the national strategies. The NMS directs NORTHCOM and PACOM as the lead DoD organizations for DSCA. Key support components for both NORTHCOM and PACOM come from the Army Reserve structure as will be discussed under the organization analysis. Further definitive guidance is provided by the SECDEF in his *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities*. This document is the first time the reserve component is mentioned directly in regards to DSCA in the strategic literature review.

The SECDEF defines the core capabilities in support of the “Provide DSCA” mission, which states: “ready access to non-National Guard Reserve forces.”<sup>12</sup> This statement is directed toward the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserve. These Title 10 forces are readily available to the SECDEF for DSCA missions. It further states, “DoD will develop rules and modalities to execute its authority for involuntary reserve mobilization for response to emergencies in the United States, including natural disasters.”<sup>13</sup> The SECDEF now has the authority for involuntary mobilization of non-National Guard Reservists for domestic disaster response. This statement provides the cornerstone in our examination of the Army Reserve’s role in DSCA. The Army Reserve is identified along with the other reserve component elements as being a core capability to DoD’s DSCA missions.

Transitioning to United States Army Strategy documents, the ASPG for 2013 does not specifically mention DSCA as a primary goal, though it is inherent in several specified goals in general. The ASPG states: “to enable implementation of the Total Force policy, the Army will streamline the voluntary and involuntary call to active duty of RC personnel and units.”<sup>14</sup> The key to this statement is the Secretary of the Army realizes he cannot accomplish unified land operations with active duty Soldiers alone. The need to fully integrate the Army Reserve into missions, DSCA being one, will be crucial to the long-term success of the Army.

Further guidance is provided in more detail in the posture statement. In the 2011 Army Posture Statement, it states the Army must “fully realize the potential of an operationalized RC and capitalize on their significant combat experience.”<sup>15</sup> Again, nothing in the doctrine review to this point precludes the Army Reserve from an increased role in DSCA. Furthermore, the doctrine to this point comes to a realization that the increased use of the reserve component is critical to future success. Without key warfighting functions in the Army Reserve, it is difficult to determine whether the active component would be successful alone.

The concept plans that cover DoD support to CBRN and DSCA events are CONPLAN 3500<sup>16</sup> and 3501.<sup>17</sup> These plans cover the establishment of DCRF missions of NORTHCOM and PACOM. These documents provide the outline of command relationships and processes required for mission assignment approval for incident response to a DSCA mission. Within the DCRF construct, Title 10 forces are provided when requested by state authority when a federal response is required.




Figure 5. DCRF Capabilities Battalion Task Force Concept

Source: JTF-CS Briefing 101 (15 July 2013).

The DCRF capabilities are generally comprised of active component elements and consist of battalion level task forces (figure 5). Force Package 1 is prepared to deploy no later than notification plus 24 hours, and Force Package 2 no later than notification plus 48 hours.<sup>18</sup> These set timelines are difficult for Army Reserve units to achieve. Generally only ten percent of an Army Reserve unit are on orders at any given time when assigned to a DSCA mission.

With Army Reserve Soldiers living up to and sometimes more than fifty miles away from their home-station reserve centers, it takes time to mobilize and deploy units.

However, in some instances, Army Reserve units are placed in the CBRN Response Enterprise under the DCRF mission, but not in a lead element role. Alert notifications would be required to notify and mobilize these units in the timeframes required. The overall Army's strategy will provide a direct impact on the role of the Army Reserve.

Missions that are decidedly inherent to the active force versus those given to the operational Army Reserve have a definitive impact on preparedness and readiness of the force and accomplishment of assigned tasks. The Army Reserve is better suited for a broader lead role in the C2CRE A/B mission (figure 2). In this construct, the units have to be prepared to deploy no later than notification plus 96 hours. This allows suitable time to notify and mobilize the unit at home-station for deployment in response to an incident.

United States Army Reserve Strategy documents however fully support DSCA preparedness. The Army Reserve published *2020: Vision & Strategy Statement* in February 2011. In this vision and strategy statement, domestic emergency is discussed, but not in detail. It states, "... units are positioned in close proximity to areas that may require domestic military support for disaster response or homeland defense."<sup>19</sup> In March 2013, LTG Jeffrey W. Talley, Chief of Army Reserve, and Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command published his posture statement and defined it further. The title: *America's Army Reserve: A Life-Saving and Life-Sustaining Force for the Nation*, Talley speaks of DSCA and states: "the core competency of the Army Reserve lends itself readily to such missions. The Army Reserve is also part of the DCRF, maintaining mission-ready Soldiers and equipment available for deployment in the event of a national emergency or disaster."<sup>20</sup>

The Army Reserve leadership clearly understands the importance of DSCA and supports its force structure to successfully meet the mission requirements. The Army Reserve provides access to additional incident response forces including, but not limited to, the following types of units: CBRN, medical, aviation, transportation, engineering, communications and logistics. These capabilities can be packaged with appropriate command and staff structure to facilitate assistance to civil authorities. This packaging also provides necessary mission command to Title 10 Department of Defense resources in a defined joint environment.<sup>21</sup> Clearly, the Army Reserve is strategically poised to meet any mission assigned to support the Total Army, and the doctrine supports the role.

To complete the analysis, Joint and Army doctrine will be analyzed. Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* states: “The domestic operating environment, in which DSCA is performed, relies on the ability of the military commander to work with other government and nongovernment agencies and organizations. A range of domestic responses is provided by the AC and RC.”<sup>22</sup> The key to this statement for the domestic operating environment is that most reserve component members operate there daily during their civilian capacities.

Immediate Response Authority (IRA) is also discussed in detail of the capabilities needed at the request of local, state, and federal civil authorities.<sup>23</sup> IRA brings a new dimension to the role of the Army Reserve and its ability to immediately assist in a DSCA role in the event of an incident. The JP also discusses the role of DCO’s and EPLO’s that we will discuss in this chapter under organization.

Army doctrine fully supports DSCA and defines the constructive use of combined arms as a force multiplier, to include the reserve component, will be crucial to the overall

mission end state success of the Army in DSCA operations.<sup>24</sup> These recent changes have not only included DSCA in ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, but have included the Army Reserve as a fully integrated partner in decisive action. This doctrine does not segregate between active or reserve Soldiers, it simply provides direction for the Total Army. So therefore, it could be affirmed that the only distinction is that between full-time and part-time.

Under tasks of decisive action for Army units, DSCA is listed as one of the four core elements, requires the following to be provided: support for domestic disasters, support for domestic CBRN incidents, support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies, and other designated support.<sup>25</sup> ADRP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, provides more specific in-depth guidance to the Army in regards to support of civil authorities. This doctrine builds on ADP 3-28, *DSCA*, and explains how the Army, including the Army Reserve, conducts DSCA missions as part of unified land operations.<sup>26</sup>

The ADRP states as well that, “units of the Army Reserve contain capabilities likely to be needed by DSCA, such as logistics, medical, construction, and bridging capabilities . . . the Army Reserve is distributed across the states and territories. Traditionally, the Army Reserve has not been organized for domestic operations, but it has been available for sourcing of . . . national emergencies.”<sup>27</sup> These characteristics of the Army Reserve clearly state their critical capabilities needed for DSCA, and their locations being a positive factor. Again, this shows the capabilities of the Army Reserve as an operational force, capable of being part of the Total Army and supporting DSCA.

## Organization

The Army Reserve is primarily structured with Protection and Sustainment Warfighting Functions (WfF). This structure enhances Army and Joint Force capabilities in support of their priorities. These units consist of engineers, logistics, military intelligence, medical and dental, civil affairs and military information support operations, military police, CBRN, and Soldier Support and Force generation units (appendix A). Additionally, these specific units support, or can be a contributor, in nearly every one of the 15 ESFs in the NRF.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, functional command structures are in place for each of the WfF's. The backbone behind every military unit and its success is how it is organized. Units must be properly organized, equipped, and manned for its assigned mission.

The Army conducts a program called *Total Army Analysis* (TAA) in a phased force structure analysis process. It examines the projected Army force from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives.<sup>29</sup> TAA objectives are to develop, analyze, and determine a program objective memorandum (POM) force, aligned with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) /Joint Staff (JS) Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and The Army Plan (TAP). The POM force is that to be projected to be raised, provisioned, sustained, and maintained within resources available during future years.<sup>30</sup>

These analytical POM force documents are used in dialogue with Congress, OSD, JS, COCOM commanders, and the Army. The TAA process ensures equipment and manning distribution to the approved or projected force structure.<sup>31</sup> The TAA provides a program basis for structuring organizational, materiel, and personnel requirements and projected authorizations.<sup>32</sup> The product of the TAA and POM process is the approved and

funded force structure for the Army. For the required resourcing purposes, the POM force is apportioned among four components: the Active Army (COMPO 1), Army National Guard (COMPO 2), Army Reserve (COMPO 3), and unsourced unit equivalents (COMPO 4).<sup>33</sup>

Therefore, the force structure of the Army Reserve should be fully resourced and structured to meet its required mission sets according to the regulation, though in reality, this is not always the case. Of those missions, DSCA would be the focus of this study. Mitigated risk has to be taken to ensure the annual budget authorized by Congress meets the overall objectives of the NSS and NMS. Further analysis would show that COMPO 1 will get the predominate funding for on-going operations around the world.

Conducting an extensive review of Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) documents on the United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) for force structure of Army Reserve units showed little difference between active and reserve unit structure.<sup>34</sup> The analysis conducted concludes that a predominant number of the Army's sustainment forces are located in the Army Reserve force structure. This comparative review clearly shows that key enablers for the active force in the Total Army construct are currently in the Army Reserve force structure. Furthermore, this relates to the previously discussed TAA process where the analysis is conducted to determine what each COMPO will be comprised of in terms of organizational structure. This analysis continues to support the essential role of the Army Reserve.


In a previous research study written by MAJ Anthony T. Murtha in May 2009 titled, "DSCA Surveying Institutional Challenges". Murtha concludes the overarching

challenge to DoD support to DSCA are the consequences in the development of an adequate command structure, and baseline operating requirements that prevent proper preparation for DoD incident response.<sup>35</sup> His research provides a comparative platform to this research by establishing a baseline for arriving at conclusions and recommendations. However, many organizational changes have taken place in the Army Reserve over the course of five years since Murtha's research was finalized.

One such change implemented in United States Army Strategy documents, the Army Strategic Planning Guidance for 2013, does not specifically mention DSCA as a primary goal, though it is inherent in several specified goals in general. Of note is the near term need for Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF).<sup>36</sup> In order for the Army to organize, man, train and equip both the AC and the RC, specific aligned force packages have begun to be established. These force packages will be structured to meet the requirements set forth by the combatant commander's in the field. Furthermore, it discusses the need for the Army to fully integrate the AC and RC forces, and their capabilities, down to the tactical level as appropriate.

The Army Reserve has taken the necessary steps to support the COCOMs in RAF, and has taken it a step further in the development of Army Reserve Engagement Cells (ARECs) to support NORTHCOM and PACOM.<sup>37</sup> These measures will greatly enhance the Army Reserve's DSCA response. The ARECs will provide an enabling element to the Total Army and Joint Force with indispensable capabilities at home and abroad. They will have direct communication with key leaders at the COCOMs and ASCCs, as well as with key leadership within the Headquarters, United States Army Reserve Command.<sup>38</sup>

The proposed structure as of March 2013 provides key enablers within the ARECs to meet the needs of the ASCCs (figure 6), and greatly enhance DSCA response.



Source: Compiled from Readiness Core Enterprise (RCE) & U.S. Army Reserve Command G-3/5/7 Brief 18 March 2013

Figure 6. US Army Reserve Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) / Army Reserve Engagement Cell (AREC) Implementation

Source: Created by author.

Another research paper in line with this research is a monograph written by Mr. Joseph Austin in March 2007 titled, "DSCA-Are We Organized Right?" In his study, he concludes several items that have since been addressed by the DoD. He speaks to a better situational awareness after a major catastrophic event, which now is handled at the NORTHCOM, ARNORTH, and JTF-CS levels to better proficiency than that of 2007.

He states as well, that the RFA process needed modification to accelerate the process. This process has been refined as well in the utilization of NIMS. He was correct in his analysis in both cases. Significantly, he states as well that the operational integration between AC, RC, and National Guard capabilities into planning and exercises for catastrophic events needs to improve.<sup>39</sup> Austin's research was utilized to correlate his conclusions in relation to the research question established in reference to the Army Reserve and its role in DSCA, and many of his points have now been addressed.

In terms of the organizational structure, the Army Reserve provides NORTHCOM; a manning report provided by an assignment officer from the U.S. Army Human Resource Command (HRC) shows 31 total currently approved Army Reserve Active Guard/Reserve positions.<sup>40</sup> These full time Army Reserve positions range from Deputy Defense Coordinator, plans officers, logistical officers, and Deputy Chief of Operations at NORTHCOM, ARNORTH, and JTF-CS.<sup>41</sup> These critical positions provide a conduit of information between NORTHCOM and USARC. These positions are in addition to the previously stated Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs). EPLO positions are authorized in each FEMA region and state from the Title 10, USC, reserve forces.<sup>42</sup> This Total Army concept of inclusion will only provide additional quantifiable assets to NORTHCOM from the Army Reserve, and its Soldiers.

In another journal article, "Exchanging Business Cards-The Impact of the NDAA of 2012 on Domestic Disaster Response," COL (Ret) John Conway speaks to the benefits of the changes made in NDAA 2012. Conway states for the first time the pool of responders will include over 380,000 reserve component members, providing an "all in" military response to DSCA events.<sup>43</sup> He further speaks to the force multiplier these forces

bring to the mission, and believes it makes sense to call up local Title 10 reserves before summoning active duty assets due to locality and distance.<sup>44</sup>

He does however state that initial response on day one by Title 10 reservists is not practical or planned.<sup>45</sup> He completes his insights by stating the reserve component headquarters need to turn their attention to planning for disaster-relief augmentation. His overall thesis is that exercising frequently for all future local, state, and national-level disaster exercises needs to include mobilization of Title 10 reserve forces. This in his opinion assures the all-in approach to DoD disaster mitigation.<sup>46</sup> The analysis of the research leads the author to believe that the Army Reserve is indeed organized to meet each contingency of DSCA missions.

### Training

Training in the Army as defined in *ADRP 7-0* is, “a system of techniques and standards that allow units and Soldiers to determine, acquire, and practice necessary skills. Candid assessments, after action reviews, and applied lessons learned and best practices produce versatile units, quality Soldiers . . . for all aspects of an operational environment.”<sup>47</sup> Nowhere in this Army Doctrine does it differentiate training between the active and reserve component. Therefore, the same training objectives to be met for the active component must be met by the reserve component. The only difference in that training is time. Utilizing time as a factor, effective analysis of training can be achieved.

Through the study of previous research, the author evaluated the works similar in background to this primary research, though previous study is limited to the research topic. Understanding the conclusion(s) of previous research provided insight into the criticality of this study. In a study is titled, “The Role of the Army Reserve in the

Weapons of Mass Destruction /Homeland Defense Program.” written by Major Joseph L. Smith, completed in June 2000, he concludes that the Army Reserve’s core competencies in the areas of WMD, CBRN, and medical response make it the ideal training and response arm of DoD.<sup>48</sup> Additionally, he states the Army Reserve would become the nation’s premier trainer of first responders and the Army’s primary consequence management coordination and response element.<sup>49</sup> Lastly, he states at the time of his study, that the Army Reserve is ready to use its unique capabilities to become a major player in the WMD/HD mission.<sup>50</sup> This research used his findings to formulate a parallel into how Smith derived his conclusions in relation to the research question of this study to the Army Reserve’s role in DSCA today. Though his research is relevant, many changes have occurred in the 14 years that have passed.

As previously discussed in chapter 2, the Army Reserve created in the summer of 2004, the Red Dragon exercise as a non-program of record exercise funded by the Army Reserve internally. This small exercise continues to grow each year, and in 2009-trained approximately 3,000 Soldiers.<sup>51</sup> The depth and breadth of this exercise has continued to morph into a multi-functional annual event. As depicted in the Red Dragon 2014 Task Organization (appendix C) has provided intensive “real world” training to Army Reserve units in every WfF. Ten years of exercises have now been conducted and recently ARNORTH has assimilated into the exercise to provide observer/controller-trainers (OC-Ts) from their Civil Support Training & Assessment Teams. This integrated operating environment has provided highly trained Army Reserve Soldiers for previous, current, and future rotational DSCA missions.

The focused training did not sojourn there. In January 2006, Headquarters, United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) published a memorandum titled, “*National Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) Training*.” In the memorandum, USARC mandated all commands who fell into the scope of DSCA, which was the entire force, to immediately implement a short and long-term training strategy that would enable Army Reserve units and Soldiers a broader, more defined understanding of DSCA. These actions would continue to increase in the years to come.

Training for decisive action and the full range of military operations is nothing new to the Army Reserve. As the operational environment has changed, so too has the Army Reserve. An Army Reserve Major General currently serves as the Chief of Staff for NORAD and NORTHCOM.<sup>52</sup> These key billets filled by Army Reserve senior leaders show integration into combatant commands. This integration has led to training opportunities that will in turn bring forth great experience back to the Army Reserve.

One such focused training exercise that has now become fully integrated with active and reserve component forces is Vibrant Response. Army North acts as the exercise agent for NORTHCOM in this exercise that focuses on four milestones of prepare, partner, protect, and respond.<sup>53</sup> Exercise Vibrant Response confirms the operational and tactical capabilities of elements of DOD’s CBRN response enterprise. United States Army North conducts high-tempo field training exercises for the DCRF and C2CRE elements to prepare them for mission assumption.<sup>54</sup> Key exercise tasks include executing mission command, performing technical tasks in CBRN consequence management, conducting other life-saving missions, providing logistics support to a

theater of operations, and exercising military homeland CBRN response and civil support plans.<sup>55</sup> This exercise provides the Total Army premier training at Camp Atterbury, IN.

The Army Reserve has not rested in its approach to DSCA. In June 2013, the Army Reserve updated and published CONPLAN 500, DSCA.<sup>56</sup> The purpose of this concept plan is to define the roles and functions the Army Reserve executes while supporting DSCA. The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) will conduct DSCA operations in a five-phase plan. The five-phase approach consists of, Phase 0 (Shape), Phase I (Anticipate), Phase II (Respond), Phase III (Operate) and Phase IV (Transition).<sup>57</sup>

Attributes, Principles, Capabilities, and Tasks, include operational areas in each COCOM, employment categories in which Army Reserve forces can provide response capability for the Supported COCOM, roles that Army Reserve forces play in support of DSCA, to include, allocated forces, apportioned forces, Immediate Response Authority (IRA), Army Reserve installations and facilities support, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers. Implications include operational limitations, legal considerations, funding, public affairs, medical services and protection.<sup>58</sup> This in-depth concept plan focuses training for the entire Army Reserve force structure.

In addition, a fragmentary order for a DSCA OPLAN enterprise planning team was published to ensure an aggressive timeline for full operating capability.<sup>59</sup> This aggressive direction and planning clearly shows the Army Reserve is leaning forward to effectively meet its directed DoD mission in support of DSCA. Whether training is conducted at home station, or an exercise, the Army Reserve is showing their ability to be an operational reserve. Gone are the days of one weekend a month, and two weeks in the summer. The Strategic Reserve will never again be an option for our Total Army.

## Summary

As stated in *ADRP 6-0*, “Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”<sup>60</sup> Within the construct of unified land operations, mission command is one of the foundations. Furthermore, it goes onto state that, “philosophy of command helps commanders capitalize on the human ability to take action to develop the situation and integrate military operations to achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state.”<sup>61</sup> The emphasis of mission command therefore centralizes the intent and distributed execution through disciplined initiative.<sup>62</sup> This principle guides leaders toward mission accomplishment, and in the Army Reserve, this is nothing new. With geographically dispersed organizations and Soldiers, Army Reserve leaders have shown initiative in all their training. Leaders must have trust in their subordinates to accomplish the mission, especially when they can be hundreds of miles from a headquarters.

For the analysis and purpose of this thesis, it was not difficult to locate information, which focused on the topic of the Army Reserve and DSCA. The scope however assisted the author in limiting the search to those specific documents that would assist in answering the research questions. The outcome of this process does however promote significant challenges on providing factual analysis versus personal opinions and biases.

In a journal article titled, “An Indispensable Force: Investing in America’s National Guard and Reserves.” written by John Nagl and Travis Sharp, and published by the Center for a New American Security in September 2010, the authors delve deep into

the role of the reserve component. The authors' state, "DHS has yet to provide DoD with appropriate WMD response requirements, poor planning, inadequate resources and turf battles still hinder the ability of the Guard and Reserve to maximize their preparedness and effectiveness as a crisis-response force."<sup>63</sup> The authors' further state that since 2008, NORTHCOM has in fact incorporated Guard and Reserve personnel into over 100 billets. They believe this integration will lead to on-going success for NORTHCOM.<sup>64</sup> The significance of this journal paper is the identification of the budgetary shortfalls. The authors' believe if properly funded, the reserve component gives our nation the greatest benefit for every dollar allocated, but shortfalls still exist today.

The Army Reserve makes up only twenty percent of the Army's organized units, but provides about half of the Army's sustainment forces. At just three percent of the Army's budget, the Army Reserve provides a cost effective solution to the Total Army.<sup>65</sup> This shows that the Total Army in times of budget constraints can depend on the Army Reserve as an operational force, one that is able to train for and respond in a timely manner.

Doctrine, Organization, and Training comprise key elements in DoD's success in DSCA, and the role the Army Reserve fulfills. Analysis shows that to be successful in any of these categories, it takes great leadership. Leadership as defined in *ADRP 6-22* is, "the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. As an element of combat power, leadership unifies the other elements of combat power. Confident, competent, and informed leadership intensifies the effectiveness of the other elements of combat

power.”<sup>66</sup> Success is not defined by active or reserve, but by the leadership shown by our senior Army or Army Reserve leaders.

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<sup>1</sup>MG Jeffrey A. Jacobs, “CCMRF and Use of Federal Forces in Civil Support Operations,” *Army Magazine* (July 2009), 16-20.

<sup>2</sup>Department of Defense, Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3500.

<sup>3</sup>Mark M. Beckler, “Insurrection Act Restored: States Likely to Maintain Authority Over National Guard in Domestic Emergencies” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2008).

<sup>4</sup>Danielle Crockett, “The Insurrection Act and Executive Power to Respond with Force to Natural Disasters” (University of California, Berkley School of Law, 2007).

<sup>5</sup>Department of Defense, *DSCA Handbook*, 1-5

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 1-6.

<sup>7</sup>Federal Emergency Management Administration. *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, and Related Authorities*. June 2007.

<sup>8</sup>Department of Defense, *DSCA Handbook*, 2-4.

<sup>9</sup>CPT Dan Marchik, “Army Reserve participates in Homeland Disaster Response Exercise.” *Warrior Citizen Magazine* (Fall 2013), 32-34.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 18.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>14</sup>Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013*, 10.

<sup>15</sup>Department of the Army, *2011 Army Posture Statement*, , 8.

<sup>16</sup>Department of Defense, Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3500.

<sup>17</sup>Department of Defense, Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3501.

<sup>18</sup>Department of Defense, Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3500.

<sup>19</sup>USARC, *2020: Vision and Strategy Statement*, 6

<sup>20</sup>USARC, 2013 Posture Statement, iii.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>22</sup>CJCS, JP 3-28, 1-2.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., I-7.

<sup>24</sup>Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, May 2012), 1-15.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 2-5.

<sup>26</sup>Department of the Army, ADRP 3-28, iii.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 2-7.

<sup>28</sup>Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 31.

<sup>29</sup>Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 71-11, *Total Army Analysis* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1995), 1.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Department of the Army, Force Management System Web Site, <https://fmsweb.army.mil> (accessed 9 February 2014).

<sup>35</sup>Anthony Murtha, “DSCA Surveying Institutional Challenges” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2009), 39-40.

<sup>36</sup>Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013*, 10.

<sup>37</sup>United States Army Reserve Command, “Regional Alignment of Forces/Army Reserve Engagement Cell (AREC) Implementation Briefing” (Headquarters, United States Army Reserve Command, Fort Bragg, NC, March 2013).

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Joseph Austin, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities—Are We Organized Right?” (Research Project, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 2007), 30.

<sup>40</sup>Major Eric Samaritoni, “Request Information on Army Reserve AGR positions supporting USNORTHCOM,” Email to author, February 10, 2014.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>CJCS, JP 3-28, 2-13.

<sup>43</sup>COL (Ret) John L. Conway, “Exchanging Business Cards-The Impact of the NDAA of 2012 on Domestic Disaster Response,” *Air and Space Power Journal* (July-August 2012), 124.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 126.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 127.

<sup>47</sup>Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2012), 1-1.

<sup>48</sup>Joseph L. Smith, “The Role of the Army Reserve in the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Homeland Defense Program” (Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 2000), 72.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 72.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Vail, “Exercise Red Dragon 2009,” 42.

<sup>52</sup>Department of Defense, U.S. Northen Command Homepage, <https://www.northcom.mil/home.aspx> (accessed 15 December 2013).

<sup>53</sup>USARNORTH, *Vibrant Response 13-2 Fact Sheet*, 1.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>United States Army Reserve Command, *OPLAN 500 (DSCA)* (Fort Bragg, NC, 4 June 2013), 1.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>United States Army Reserve Command, *Fragmentary Order 007 (DSCA OPLAN EPT) to Operations Orders 12-082 (Base Order – Enterprise Planning Teams)*, (Fort Bragg, NC, 25 June 2013).

<sup>60</sup>Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2012), 1-1.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>John Nagl and Travis Sharp, “An Indispensable Force: Investing in America’s National Guard and Reserves,” *Center for a New American Security Report* (September 2010), 9.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>65</sup>Department of the Army, *2013 Army Posture Statement*, 4.

<sup>66</sup>Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2012), 1-1.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The National Guard and Reserves remain an indispensable force for defending the American homeland and protecting U.S. security interests around the world. Civilian Guardsmen and Reservists possess specialized skills that augment their military capabilities, rendering them a cost-effective and highly talented force well suited for operations that the U.S. military will likely perform over the next 20 years.

— General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Retired)<sup>1</sup>

#### Introduction

The purpose of this study was to examine the role of the United States Army Reserve in support of DSCA. The scope of this study was limited to the Army Reserve and did not take into consideration other reserve component elements in regards to their role in DSCA. The resolve of the study was to identify and address the gaps and shortfalls in doctrine, organization, and training as it related to the research question. This narrowed focus remained throughout to be only the Army Reserve, and its employment of forces in support of DSCA. The objective throughout was to remain truly unbiased, and allowing the interpretation of the evidence to lead to discovery and conclusions.

The first chapter provided an overview and introduction to the study, problem statement, and proposed research question(s). Furthermore, this chapter provided the significance of the study, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations which provided the scope for the research. The second chapter identified and established the background doctrine and literature required to accomplish the study. Finally, the third and fourth chapters defined the methodology used to objectively analyze the qualitative data that was developed in the course of the research.

This final chapter provides conclusions and recommendations based on that qualitative data used in the methodology to address the research questions. As discussed in the limitations, delimitations, and scope sections of the first chapter, the restrictions on this study with regard to time prevented an extensive and more thorough investigation; this work however provides the foundation for further research. The paradigm of the research method utilized during this study was primarily a document review analysis concentrating on the Doctrine, Organization, and Training elements of the DOTMLPF model. As the conclusions and recommendations are discussed, emphasis will be placed on these main concentrations.

### Conclusions

Through the course of this research several key elements became evident. Current Doctrine is sound, encompassing, and has no gaps identified in regards to the Army Reserve's role in DSCA. Doctrine indisputably establishes that the Army Reserve has a very distinct role in DSCA in support of the Army. Additionally, the doctrine and literature review resoundingly supported the role of the Army Reserve in DSCA. From previous research to standing directives, all the findings led to the Army Reserve being a fully integrated partner in the Total Army construct in regards to DSCA. However, the one resounding factor that continued to arise from the data collected was that nothing noted the Army Reserve providing a lead role in DSCA as it pertained to the initial response force. The initial response force in the CBRN Enterprise known as DCRF, did however state the need for Army Reserve units in a support role, but not the lead.

This evidence showed the manner in which the Army Reserve supports DSCA during a catastrophic event or presidential call-up definitively. Forces historically

apportioned to DoD's standing task forces of Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) and Command and Control CBRN Response Element A/B (C2CRE A/B) have continued to be a key element in DSCA and include Army Reserve units. However, based on the preponderance of evidence, it is imperative that the initial response forces are able to arrive within the specified planning timelines. These timelines are very difficult for Army Reserve units to achieve. With this understanding, the doctrine leads the conclusion to be that the Army Reserve can fully support a lead role in command and control of C2CRE A/B, but not the initial response force of DCRF.

In regards to organization, nothing precludes an increased role in the supporting elements of DSCA because of the force structure analysis. The discovery of information provided that there is little difference in the force structure of the active and reserve components. The only resounding difference in the organizational structure is predominately full-time versus part-time. The Army Reserve meets the requirements set forth in Total Army Analysis, and fully supports the NSS and NMS. However, as time as a factor, answering one of the secondary research questions, "How would the Army Reserve accomplish this mission with limited time and resources?", it should be known that there is a distinct difference in the organization, but not the organizational structure.

Army Reserve units typically meet one weekend a month (24 total days) for battle assembly, and two weeks (14-29 days) a year, depending on where they are in the ARFORGEN cycle. That is comparatively a possible 38 to 53 days a year per unit.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, even though the active and reserve component units may be structured the same, the amount of time associated training the organization is clearly different. Active duty units have 365 days a year together minus leave and liberty. Clearly, this factor of

time is the difference on the eventual outcome of success of an organization. However, to note, Army Reserve units typically concentrate on training during these periods, and external distractors are limited unlike active component units in “Red Cycle” training.

The summarization of the data offered in regards to training provided applicable conclusions on our final secondary research question, “How could the Army Reserve man, equip, and train forces required to proactively and comprehensively support operations during DSCA events?”, and clearly showed the Army Reserve is capable of meeting training requirements. As the discovery of information showed, the Army Reserve has become fully integrated into NORTHCOM and its subordinate elements.

DSCA training in the Army Reserve has been ongoing for over twenty years, and since the early part of this century, the Army Reserve has been training Soldiers and units annually in their exercise called Red Dragon. This exercise has become a model for NORTHCOM, and in turn, they developed their own collective exercise called Vibrant Response. These two exercises have a strong Army Reserve presence each year. The advantage for the Army Reserve versus the active component is that Army Reserve Soldiers typically stay with their unit longer. This lasting presence provides sustained expertise in regards to DSCA. Furthermore, when Army Reserve units are assigned to a standing DSCA mission under the CBRN Enterprise, their focus stays on that mission for a period of two years.

Therefore, manning does not become an issue. Units assigned to a DSCA mission are typically fenced. This fencing action keeps the Soldiers in the units for the duration of the mission. Equipment sets are typically provided if an additional mission set is required of the unit. However, with continued rotations, the Army Reserve has refined the way

they rotate DSCA based operational equipment from unit to unit while on the mission.

Finally, to answer the last portion of the question, training the force has typically not been an issue. As noted previously, Soldiers will stay longer in their units than their active component counterparts will. Units are given as well one year of train-up and validation prior to assuming the DSCA mission by ARNORTH.

Finally, I conclude on the information derived by the research design of qualitative data techniques applied to the primary research question, “What will be the Army Reserve’s role in Defense Support of Civil Authorities future missions while operating in a resource-constrained environment?”, and the final outcomes of this research.

The answer can be concluded through the examination of DoD’s DSCA missions, and how DSCA has evolved to meet the requirements set forth by Congress. The effectiveness of NORTHCOM, PACOM, and their subordinate commands have led to an increased awareness of the importance of DSCA, and how DoD plays a very critical role in its success. Reduction in the active duty forces will potentially lead to an increased role for the Army Reserve; furthermore, creating a force multiplier for DoD and the Army. The author believes Army Reserve will see an increased role in DSCA in the years to come. However, this increased role will come at a price.

The price to pay for the Army Reserve to provide an increased role in DSCA will quite possibly mean a narrowed focus training. This narrowed focused training can be eliminated by properly establishing the Army Reserve ARFORGEN model to only allow units to participate on the DSCA allocated or apportioned mission once every five years. This assigned two years on mission will allow the unit to continue to train on its

functional Mission Essential Task List (METL) in the other three years of the ARFORGEN cycle. With current budget constraints and reduction in forces, the active component will continue to be spread quite thin to meet its required missions abroad. The Army Reserve will have to provide additional forces for DSCA if the Total Army is to succeed.

#### Recommendations

One recommendation is the full integration of AC and RC Soldiers into specified DSCA units. Conceptual designs are discussed daily in the Army. By assigning Army Reserve AGR Soldiers to positions into these proposed new structures would bring added value to the DSCA mission. Moreover, in turn, this would provide Soldiers upon rotation back to Army Reserve units with experience working daily with their AC counterparts. This is already in place in many critical billets within the Army AC structure.

This design is already being utilized as previously discussed with the integration of Army Reserve full-time Soldiers into NORTHCOM command structure, as well as the ARECs. Integration utilizing the Total Army construct is key to the long-term success of DoD's DCSA missions. By utilizing not only full-time Army Reserve Soldiers, but the Troop Program Unit Soldiers as well, the long-term sustainment of skills will only increase.

The second and final recommendation is for the Army Reserve to stand-up a CONUS based unit in line, but modified force structure, to that of the 7TH Civil Support Command in Germany. This new command would be the centralized command for all Army Reserve units apportioned or allocated to a DSCA mission. The recommendation would be for an existing structure to be redesignated to be the Army Reserve lead. This

command should be somewhat centrally located in the continental United States, or co-located with ARNORTH in San Antonio, Texas. This co-location would ease daily communications between the staffs and provide a synergy in DSCA headquarters never before seen in DoD or the Army.

#### Areas for Further Research

Due to the limitations of this study, the entire DOTMLPF process could not be researched. Further study should be conducted on the forth element, which would be materiel. Suggested further research could include questions: is all the necessary equipment available, and is there a requirement for commercial off-the-shelf equipment; does the organizations have all the required equipment to successfully accomplish the missions?

Additionally, leadership as the fifth element could also be researched. Further research could question if the Army Reserve can prepare its leaders to lead DSCA missions at all levels and provide professional development to ensure on-going success? Again, a general analysis of the MTOE structure will also be required to properly conclude if the key elements are in place. With limited training time available, how would the Army Reserve confront the magnitude of ensuring effective leaders are in place to guide the units to success in support of DSCA missions?

Furthermore, personnel as the sixth element and possibly the over-arching issue could pose interesting research. Availability of qualified Soldiers for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency missions to include DSCA could be above the capabilities currently assigned. The research here would be to review the personnel that comprise the organization as a whole and analyze their ability to accomplish the assigned missions. A

review of MTOEs from across the Army Reserve spectrum as a whole can be conducted, but detailed unit analysis could lead to future research in just this element.

Finally, facilities as the seventh and final element of the DOTMLPF model should be researched. In broad terms, the focus of this area of research will be focused toward real property; installations and industrial facilities (e.g. government owned facilities) that support DoD forces (Army Reserve) in support of DSCA. Army Reserve centers are located in every state, commonwealth, and territory of the US. The key questions here would be: Are they structured for DSCA and rapid deployment? Can they be modified to meet the needs of required training? Approaching this subject in generalities, for as to research all of the locations would simply not be possible in this limited research construct. However, the author believes that this could have an effect on future construction.

### Summary

This research is important to both NORTHCOM and PACOM in their determinations of missions set forth for Army Reserve units in the future. Furthermore, it could also assist Army Reserve planners in understanding the requirements set forth from civilian authorities and assist them in key decisions in regards to doctrine, organization, and training. This study has provided a discovery of conclusions and recommendations that will assist future planners throughout DoD in their DSCA planning.

As stated in a report from the Department of Defense titled, *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*, “A smaller active force requires a capable and ready Reserve Component. Among other applications, a strong Reserve Component is a vital element of the concept of reversibility embedded in the strategic guidance. Consequently, we are

making only marginal reductions in the Army Reserve.”<sup>3</sup> The active component is reducing its force structure, and with reduction in forces the Total Army will look to the Army Reserve as an operational force. The Army Reserve is, and will be ready for all challenges in the future.

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<sup>1</sup>John Nagl and Travis Sharp, “An Indispensable Force: Investing in America’s National Guard and Reserves,” *Center for a New American Security Report* (September 2010), Foreword.

<sup>2</sup>Congressional Research Service, *Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers*, 4.

<sup>3</sup>Department of Defense, *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*, [https://defense.gov/news/defense\\_budget\\_priorities.pdf](https://defense.gov/news/defense_budget_priorities.pdf) (accessed 9 February 2014).

## GLOSSARY

**Active Duty for Special Work/Operational Support (ADSW or ADOS).** Tour of active duty for reserve personnel authorized from military and reserve personnel appropriations for work on active or reserve component programs. (JP 1-0)

**Active Duty for Training (ADT).** A tour of active duty which is used for training members of the Reserve Components to provide trained units and qualified persons to fill the needs of the Armed Forces in time of war or national emergency and such other times as the national security requires. The member is under orders that provide for return to nonactive status when the period of active duty for training is completed. This includes annual training, special tours of active duty for training, school tours, and the initial duty for training performed by nonprior service enlistees. (JP 1-02)

**Active Guard and Reserve (AGR).** National Guard and Reserve members who are on voluntary active duty providing full-time support to National Guard, Reserve, and Active Component organizations for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserve Components. (CJCSM 3150.13)

**Annual Training (AT).** The minimal period of training reserve members must perform each year to satisfy the training requirements associated with their Reserve Component assignment. (JP 1-02)

**Catastrophic Event.** Any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. (JP 3-28)

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incident.** Any occurrence, resulting from the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and devices; the emergence of secondary hazards arising from counterforce targeting; or the release of toxic industrial materials into the environment, involving the emergence of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards. (JP 3-11)

**Combatant Command (command authority).** Nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. (JP 1)

**Complex Catastrophe.** Any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and caused

extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts, and/or government functions. (DepSecDef Memo OSD001185-13)

Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). A staff and military liaison officers who assist the defense coordinating officer in facilitating coordination and support to activated emergency support functions. (JP 3-28)

Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). Department of Defense single point of contact for domestic emergencies who is assigned to a joint field office to process requirements for military support, forward mission assignments through proper channels to the appropriate military organizations, and assign military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated emergency support functions. (JP 3-28)

Economy Act. The Economy Act permits federal agencies to provide resources and services to other federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. The Economy Act is also the basis for the general rule that DoD will not compete with commercial businesses. (Department of Defense, *DSCA Handbook*)

Emergency Authority. A Federal military commander's authority, in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization by the President is impossible and duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation, to engage temporarily in activities that are necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances because (1) such activities are necessary to prevent significant loss of life or wanton destruction of property and are necessary to restore governmental function and public order or (2) duly constituted Federal, state, or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for Federal property or Federal governmental functions. (DODD 3025.18)

Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO). A senior reserve officer who represents their Service at the appropriate joint field office conducting planning and coordination responsibilities in support of civil authorities. (JP 3-28)

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). A grouping of government and certain private-sector capabilities into an organizational structure to provide the support, resources, program implementation, and services that are most likely to be needed to save lives, protect property and the environment, restore essential services and critical infrastructure, and help victims and communities return to normal, when feasible, following domestic incidents. (JP 3-28)

Homeland. The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. (JP 3-28)

Home Station. The permanent location of active duty units and Reserve Component units (e.g., location of armory or reserve center). (JP 4-05)

**Immediate Response.** Any form of immediate action taken in the United States and territories to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage in response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions when time does not permit approval from a higher authority. (JP 3-28)

**Inactive Duty Training (IDT).** Authorized training performed by a member of a Reserve Component not on active duty or active duty for training and consisting of regularly scheduled unit training assemblies, additional training assemblies, periods of appropriate duty or equivalent training, and any special additional duties authorized for Reserve Component personnel by the Secretary concerned, and performed by them in connection with the prescribed activities of the organization in which they are assigned with or without pay. (JP 1)

**Incident Command System (ICS).** A standardized on-scene emergency management construct designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. (JP 3-28)

**Incident Management.** A national comprehensive approach to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. (JP 3-28)

**Mission Assignment (MA).** The vehicle used by the Department of Homeland Security/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency Management Agency to support federal operations in a Stafford Act major disaster or emergency declaration that orders immediate, short-term emergency response assistance when an applicable state or local government is overwhelmed by the event and lacks the capability to perform, or contract for, the necessary work. (JP 3-28)

**Mobilization (MOB).** The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. See also industrial mobilization. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Component as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories: a. selective mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, Individual Ready Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack. b. partial mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national

security. c. full mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units and individuals in the existing approved force structure, as well as all retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months. d. total mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (JP 4-05)

**National Emergency.** A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be undertaken in the national interest. (JP 3-28)

**National Incident Management System (NIMS).** A national crisis response system that provides a consistent, nationwide approach for federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. (JP 3-41)

**National Military Command System (NMCS).** The priority component of the Global Command and Control System designed to support the President, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities. (JP 6-0)

**National Security Strategy (NSS).** A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (JP 1)

**Natural Disaster.** An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause. (JP 3-29)

**Nongovernmental Organization (NGO).** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08)

**Pre-Position.** To place military units, equipment, or supplies at or near the point of planned use or at a designated location to reduce reaction time, and to ensure timely support of a specific force during initial phases of an operation. (JP 4-0)

**Request for Assistance (RFA).** A request based on mission requirements and expressed in terms of desired outcome, formally asking the Department of Defense to provide assistance to a local, state, tribal, or other federal agency. (JP 3-28)

Selected Reserve. Those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. Selected Reservists actively participate in a Reserve Component training program. The Selected Reserve also includes persons performing initial active duty for training. (JP 4-05)

Whole Community. Whole community includes: individuals, families, households, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and local, state, tribal, territorial, and Federal governments. Whole community is defined in the National Preparedness Goal as “a focus on enabling the participation in national preparedness activities of a wider range of players from the private and nonprofit sectors, including nongovernmental organizations and the general public, in conjunction with the participation of Federal, state, and local governmental partners in order to foster better coordination and working relationships.” (*The National Response Framework*, May 2013)

**APPENDIX A**  
**ARMY RESERVE CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF ARMY AND**  
**JOINT FORCE PRIORITIES**

<b>Army Reserve Capabilities</b> <i>In Support of Army &amp; Joint Force Priorities</i>						
						
						
<b>Engineers</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Combat &amp; Construction Engineering</li> <li>• Design, Planning, &amp; Project Management</li> </ul>	<b>Logistics</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Petroleum Pipeline &amp; Distribution Management</li> <li>• Maintenance &amp; Transportation</li> <li>• Railway &amp; Water Terminal Operations</li> </ul>	<b>Military Intelligence</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multi-disciplined Tactical &amp; Strategic Intelligence</li> <li>• Linguists</li> </ul>	<b>Medical &amp; Dental</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theater Medical Support &amp; Evacuation</li> <li>• Preventive, Laboratory, &amp; Veterinary Services</li> </ul>	<b>Civil Affairs &amp; Military Information Support Operations (MISO)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military-Civilian Liaison/Cultural Communication</li> <li>• Establish/Restore Governance</li> </ul>	<b>Military Police</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Internment &amp; Resettlement Operations</li> <li>• Law Enforcement/Community Policing Capacity</li> </ul>	<b>Chemical</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, &amp; Nuclear (CBRN) General Purpose</li> <li>• Biological &amp; Chemical Detection</li> </ul>
						

*Source:* United States Army Reserve Command, *Rally Point 32*, Tri-Fold Guide (Fort Bragg, NC, June 2012).

## APPENDIX B

### DSCA INTERAGENCY PARTNER GUIDE, MARCH 2013

**What is DSCA?**

DSCA is support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and in coordination with the Governors, Federally funded National Guard forces in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for "special events."

**Who We Are**

We are the DSCA Office and are located within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs. We coordinate DoD's domestic efforts in support of other Federal Departments and Agencies, States, and local authorities.

**What We Do**

When requested, DoD can provide essential, life-saving assistance to civil authorities in response to a crisis or a natural disaster, or in support of special events when local, Tribal, and State capabilities are overwhelmed or exhausted. This support is available within the United States, including any territory or possession.

**What You Can Do**

Don't wait for a crisis to unfold to learn how this process can help your community. Ask if there is an existing Mutual Aid Agreement between your community and any nearby DoD installations or if your State has an EMAC agreement. Such agreements can save lives and mitigate damage during a time of crisis. Check for updates of this guide at the following website:

[http://policy.defense.gov/portals/111/DocumentLibrary/references/DSCA\\_Interagency\\_Partner%20Guide.pdf](http://policy.defense.gov/portals/111/DocumentLibrary/references/DSCA_Interagency_Partner%20Guide.pdf)

"We must always be preparing for the next disaster" and focused on "what we can do."  
- W. Craig Fugate, FEMA Administrator, August 29, 2010

DoD is a partner in support of FEMA, whose mission is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect communities nationwide from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. FEMA is organized into ten "Regions" as depicted on the map below.

FEMA coordinates response support from across the Federal Government and certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) by calling up, as needed, Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). DoD is the lead coordinator for ESF #3 and could be a major contributor in all 15 of the ESFs below:


1. Transportation	10. Oil & HAZMAT...
2. Communications	11. Agriculture & Natural Resources
3. Public Works & Engineering	12. Energy
4. Firefighting	13. Public Safety & Security
5. Emergency Management	14. Long-Term Community Recovery
6. Mass Care, Emergency...	15. External Affairs
7. Logistics Management &...	
8. Public Health & Medical Services	
9. Search & Rescue	

**Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)**

**Interagency Partner Guide**

March 2013


Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs  
2600 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-2600



## APPENDIX C


### RED DRAGON EXERCISE 2014 TASK ORGANIZATION

# RD14 TASK ORGANIZATION



*Source:* Email from Major Mark Payne, Operations Officer, 415th CBRN BDE, *Red Dragon 2014 Update Brief* (Greenville, SC, 17 December 2013).

APPENDIX D  
NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM



Source: Department of Homeland Security, *National Incident Management System (NIMS)* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, December 2013).

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